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Challenges and Opportunities for the Tax
Professional Guiding Closely-Held Entities:
2009 & 2010 Regulatory and Judicial
Developments Impacting Fourth Circuit Tax
Practitioners
ROSE L. BAILEY*
INTRODUCTION
As tax practitioners are well aware, today's world of Internal
Revenue Code § 6694(a) preparer penalties' and Circular 230 sanctions2
requires one to be well versed in tax pronouncement and tax litigation
from various jurisdictions. In most cases, such penalties can be avoided
where asserted tax positions are based on reasonable assumptions

* Rose L. Bailey LL.M, CPA, Esq. is an Assistant Professor at East Carolina
University with a teaching/research focus in taxation and law. After a twenty-plus year
career in legal/accounting practice with regional and national accounting and law firms,
she entered academics. Her professional and research areas of emphasis include estate
and income tax issues, with a particular interest in issues impacting closely-held entities
and entrepreneurs.
1. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (LexisNexis 2010). Preparer penalties can be assessed on a
preparer of a substantial portion of most tax returns, whether original or amended, or
claims for refund where tax is understated due to an asserted tax position, which is not
supported by substantial authority, and which is not otherwise adequately disclosed.
E.g., Treas. Reg. Hi 1.6694-2(a)(1)(ii), (d) (2008). Alternatively, if the tax position is
disclosed on the return, there must be a reasonable basis for the position asserted. Id. §
1.6694-2(a)(1)(iii). This standard increases to the requirement of a reasonable belief
that the asserted tax position is "more likely than not" sustainable on its merits where a
tax shelter or reportable transaction is involved. Id. § 1.6694-2(a)(1)(i).
2. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2005). Circular 230 regulates those licensed to
practice before the IRS, such as lawyers, CPAs and enrolled agents for an assembly of
issues. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(4) (2009). Sanctions can be imposed under section 10.50 of
Circular 230 for egregious behavior from failure to follow standards required of written
opinions (section 10.34), failure to meet a due diligence obligation regarding the
preparation of returns (section 10.22(a)(1)), improper use of contingent fees (section
10.27), and other deemed disreputable conduct offenses (sections 10.21, 10.23, 10.28,
10.29, and 10.31). See 31 C.F.R. H§ 10.21, .22(a)(1), .23, .27, .28, .29, .31, .34, .50; see
also 31 C.F.R. H 10.51, .52(a)(1), .52(a)(2).
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grounded in "substantial" primary authority.3 Substantial authority
includes, among other items: Internal Revenue Code sections; proposed,
temporary, and final regulations; revenue rulings; revenue procedures;
and court cases.4 There is also no question that malpractice claims can
follow where advice is offered for tax planning or Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") audit strategy, without a full review of this authority,
both within, and without a client's geographic jurisdiction. As the
practitioner considers options of appeal from an IRS administrative
hearing, often the Tax Court appears the easiest alternative since its
jurisdiction can be invoked without the payment of the disputed tax.'
Nonetheless, to make such a decision, without an understanding of the
existing judicial authority of the Tax Court, could be quite a mistake.
Yet, due to the court's status as a national court with jurisdiction over
tax matters, one cannot stop with a mere review of Tax Court decisions.
Any appeal of a Tax Court decision must be heard in the appropriate
court of appeals circuit for the taxpayer's geographic region.' Hence, a
conundrum arises where circuits have decided issues differently.' For
example, if the Tax Court rules against a North Carolina resident, who
then appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
and successfully reverses the Tax Court decision, this precedent in the
Fourth Circuit must be followed by the Tax Court in similar, nondistinguishable cases involving other North Carolina residents. Yet,
there is no requirement that such precedent be followed by the Tax
Court in a California taxpayer's similar litigation, unless the issue was
similarly decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. In fact, if the Ninth Circuit has ruled differently on the same
issue, as presented in the Fourth Circuit, the Tax Court is required to
follow the judicial precedent from the Ninth Circuit, since it is the
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2 (LexisNexis 2010).
A full list of such
4. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (2008).
authorities includes: Internal Revenue Code sections; proposed, temporary, and final
regulations; revenue rulings; revenue procedures; tax treaties and their regulations, as
well as official explanations of such treaties; court cases; committee reports reflecting
congressional intent; general explanations from the Joint Committee on Taxation
regarding tax legislation; private letter rulings and technical advice memoranda issued
after October 31, 1976; actions on decisions and general counsel memoranda issued after
March 12, 1981; IRS information or press releases; and notices, announcements, and
other administrative pronouncements published by the IRS in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin.
5. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (petition to tax court); FED. R. App. P. 13(a).
6. I.R.C. § 6123(b).
7. Id. § 7482(b); see also Mary Ann Cohen, How to Read Tax Court Opinions, 1
Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 1, 6 (2001).
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appellate circuit with jurisdiction over the California taxpayer in that
case. 8
In other words, the Tax Court may rule differently on similar facts,
deciding similar legal issues, thereby creating one result under one
circuit's precedent and a completely different result under another
circuit's precedent. Now, consider a third case arising in Tax Court on
this similar issue in yet a different circuit in which the issue has not yet
been decided. The result may well be a third interpretation if the Tax
Court chooses not to follow the rationale of other circuits and decides
under its own rationale, disagreeing with both other circuits.' So, one
can conclude that, depending on the issue, the judicial precedent of your
geographic district, the judicial precedent in prior Tax Court decisions
that have not been reversed, and the judicial precedents that may offer
supporting or opposition positions to your client from other circuits,
your required review of tax litigation can become quite expansive in
determining a position of substantial authority.
Reviewing tax litigation becomes an even greater challenge (or
opportunity) when you consider the existence of the additional
alternative appellate path from a negative IRS audit finding to the federal
district court in your geographic area or the Federal Court of Claims.
Similar to an appeal from Tax Court, any decision pursued in federal
district court is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals circuit
located in the taxpayer's geographic region.'o However, a decision
pursued in the Federal Court of Claims is appealable to the Federal
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals." This presents a third
appellate path around any undesirable judicial precedent that might
exist in a taxpayer's geographic circuit in the United States Court of
Appeals. Thus, this is yet another reason to consider carefully all
judicial precedent as you determine the appropriate position of
substantial authority.
When framing adequate tax advice to protect oneself from preparer
penalties under sometimes ambiguous or unsettled tax law, or when
8. See Golsen v. Comm'r (Golsen II), 445 F.2d 985, 988-89 (10th Cir. 1971), cert
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
9. Id.; Golsen v. Comm'r (Golsen 1), 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970). The Tax Court in
Golsen I found that where an issue has not yet been decided in a circuit, the Tax Court
can attempt to create uniform application of tax laws by applying its own judgment in
the matter. Id.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1) (2000); Id. § 1346(a)(1) (stating that the original
jurisdiction of United States district courts is concurrent with the United States Court of
Federal Claims).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
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trying to affect your best appellate argument or direct a strategic audit
litigation path, there can be no doubt of the importance of considering
judicial precedent developments in all of these paths. To that end,
under the discretion of this Author, a selection of relevant administrative
regulations and rulings as well as judicial authority rendered in 2009
through spring 2010 are contained in this Article to cover significant
income taxation developments impacting certain closely-held entities.
Closely-held entities are considered, for purposes of this Article, "flowthrough" entities regulated under two important subchapters of the
Internal Revenue Code: (i) Subchapter K governing income taxation of
partnerships;' 2 and (ii) Subchapter S governing income taxation of C
corporations electing to be taxed as S corporations."
The selected
authority for emphasis is not intended to be a fully comprehensive
review but rather a selection of those developments deemed most
important for the tax practitioner advisor.
In order to ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the
Internal Revenue Service, the author informs you that any tax advice
contained in this communication (including any attachments) was not
intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer
for the purpose of (i) avoiding tax-related penalties under the Internal
Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing, or recommending to
another party any transaction or tax-related matters addressed herein.
I.

S CORPORATIONS

A. Capital Contributionsfrom S CorporationShareholdersNot
Characterized as "Tax Exempt" Income and Unavailable to Increase Tax
Basis of S CorporationShareholder Loans
Nathel v. Commissioner (Nathel II)," decided in the Second Circuit,
provides an excellent opportunity to review basis calculation for
shareholder loans to S Corporations." Let us review the facts of Nathel
II to determine how this issue ended up in Tax Court. Ira and Sheldon
Nathel, brothers, were twenty-five percent shareholders of three S
Corporations (referenced in this Article by the acronyms of, W & N
12. I.R.C. §§ 701-77.
13.
14.
*1 (2d
15.

Id. §§ 1361-79.
Nathel v. Comm'r (Nathel II), No. 09-1955-ag, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11244, at
Cir. June 2, 2010).
See I.R.C. § 1367.
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New York, G & D Farms, Inc., and W & N California)."
Mr.
Wishnatzki, who was not a party to the litigation, owned the remaining
fifty-percent in each of these corporations. 7 Following several years of
losses in these corporations, it appears that the shareholders were in the
midst of a "parting of the ways." In August 2001, the shareholders
negotiated a reorganization plan to segregate their business
relationships." The brothers' ownership in G & D Farms was redeemed,
leaving Mr. Wishnatzki as the full owner. 9 In a similar manner, the
brothers obtained full ownership of W & N New York through the
company's full redemption of Mr. Wishnatzki's ownership.2 0
Subsequently, W & N California was liquidated.2 '
As part of their agreement to proceed with this reorganization, both
the bank and Mr. Wishnatzki required the Nathel brothers to contribute
capital of approximately $537,000 to G & D Farms and $181,396 to W
& N California in August 2001.22
This capital was demanded
consideration for the Nathel brothers' release from a prior guarantee of a
$2.5 million bank loan.23 There was also a history of the Nathel brothers
lending money to the corporation with repayments, which resulted in
loans owed to each of the brothers from G&D Farms and W&N
California of $649,775 and $161,250 respectively.24 The crux of this
litigation centered on the brothers' desire to avoid ordinary income on
the repayment of loans that they received from G&D Farms and W&N
California, which had reduced bases.25
It is well-settled law that pro-rated allocations of an S Corporation's
income to a shareholder as described in I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A) shall

16. Nathel II, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11244, at *6.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *6-7.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *6.
22. Id. at *7.
23. Id. at *6-7.
24. Id. at *6.
25. Id. at *6-7. In December 2000, each of the Nathel brothers loaned G & D Farms
$649,775. Id. at *6. At that time, the tax basis of their S Corporation stock in G & D
Farms was zero and the tax basis of the loans had been reduced to $112,457 each. Id. In
addition, W & N California owed each Nathel brother $161,250, in which each had a
basis of only $3,603. Id. at *6-7. In February 2001, G & D Farms repaid both of these
loans in full. Id. at *7. Subsequently, W & N California repaid its loans in full (at
$161,250 each) prior to its liquidation. Id.
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increase the shareholder's stock basis 6 and allocations of pro-rated
losses or deductions similarly allocated shall reduce the shareholder's
Further, where allocable deductions to a shareholder
stock basis.
decrease her stock basis to zero, any excess allocable deductions shall
only be allowed as tax deductions to the extent that sufficient basis still
exists for any loans from that shareholder to the S Corporation. The
application of these promulgated principles was not at issue in Nathel
II.29 Instead, the litigation arose over attempts by the taxpayer to classify
capital contributions as tax exempt income.30 The strategy was to
classify the capital contributions as items of tax-exempt income, thereby
qualifying the capital contributions as increased income, which would
If one can successfully allege that the capital
increase basis.3 1
contributions were characterized as tax-exempt income, then the general
rule would apply that any "increases to income" are first required to
restore any reduced basis of shareholder loans." Since the brothers'
loans to the S Corporations did have reduced bases from prior
allocations of prorated flow-through losses, the "increase to income" was
treated by the taxpayer as restoring such reduced basis of the loans."
Accordingly, $1.6 million of the 2001 loan repayments were not
reported as a taxable event but rather as a repayment of loans, which no
longer had reduced bases." Alas, the denied characterization of capital
contributions as tax-exempt income was the IRS' assessment generating
this litigation.35
The Second Circuit appears to center its holding on a lengthy
analysis of how the courts have defined "income."3 6 Section 118(a)
specifically excludes a taxpayer's capital contributions from gross

26. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1)(A) (2000).
27. See id. § 1367(a)(2)(B).
28. Id. § 1367(b)(2)(A).
29. Nathel v. Comm'r (Nathel II), No. 09-1955-ag, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11244, at
*1 (2d Cir. June 2, 2010).
30. Id. at *8.
31. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1).
32. Id. § 1367(b)(2)(B).
33. Nathel II, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11244, at *8.
34. Id. at *7-8. For the 2001 tax year, the Nathel brothers made approximately
$1.437 million in capital contributions and received approximately $1.622 million in
loan repayments. Id.
35. Id. at *9 (noting that the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to both Nathel
brothers on June 21, 2006, asserting additional taxes of approximately $280,000).
36. I.R.C. § 61(a); Nathel II, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11244, at *11-18.
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income." The legislative history underlying § 118(a) further indicates it
was enacted to codify pre-1954 judicial decisions in which payments by
non-shareholders should be capital contributions, just as if they were
from shareholders.18 Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 also specifically states that
"voluntary pro rata payments" by a shareholder for necessary business
funding "do not constitute" corporate income.
Despite this clear statutory and regulatory direction, the Second
Circuit nonetheless patiently analyzed each petitioner assertion, still
reaching the same conclusion. One of the lengthiest premises asserted by
the taxpayer was based on authority developed in the Supreme Court
case Gitlitz v. Commissioner.4 In Gitlitz, a discharge of indebtedness
originating from the cancellation of a debt converted to a creditor's
capital contribution was not excluded from taxation as a capital
contribution under I.R.C. § 118.' Yet, it was excluded from income
under the insolvency exception of § 108(a)(1)(B) and § 108(d)(7)(A). 4 1
Most importantly, the excluded income was deemed to be an income
item increasing basis under § 1366(a)(1)(A).e Therefore, in Gittitz, the
taxpayer successfully increased its S Corporation stock basis by his prorata share of discharge of indebtedness income, which had been
excluded from taxable income under the insolvency exception.44 The
key distinguishing fact in Gitlitz, as compared to Nathel II, is simply that
despite the § 108(a) exclusion of debt discharge income from gross
income during insolvency, the debt discharge income in Gitlitz was still
fundamentally an item of income under § 61(a)(12).4 ' Nathel II
distinguished Gitlitz due to the long-standing judicial precedent that
capital contributions in the normal course of business, unlike discharge
of indebtedness, are distinctly different as an item excluded from
income. Comparison to the Nathel II facts was found to be flawed."
After holding that capital contributions are not income, and
therefore do not increase basis in debt under § 1367(b)(2)(B), the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See I.R.C. § 118(a).
Nathel 11, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11244, at *17.
Id. at *18 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.118-1 (2010)).
Gitlitz v. Comm'r, 531 U.S. 206 (2001).
Id. at 213-15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 218-20.
Id. at 216.
Nathel II, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11244, at *22.
Id.
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Second Circuit addressed the taxpayer's alternative argument." That is,
failing to achieve classification of the capital contributions as tax exempt
income, the Nathel brothers asserted alternatively that contributions
made to G & D Farms were deductible under § 165(c)(2) as loss
transactions entered into for profit.' It appears to this Author that this
argument was the stronger of the two. Authority was cited by which §
165(c)(2) can be the basis to deduct losses for negotiated payments to
release a loan guarantee"o as long as such release was the primary motive
for the transaction." The Second Circuit agreed with the lower Tax
Court decision 5 2 that the taxpayer failed to prove that the guarantee
release was the primary purpose of the capital contributions.5 1 Instead,
the court identified three purposes motivating the Nathel brothers'
agreement to make the capital contributions: (i) the release of the
guarantee by the bank; (ii) the agreement of Mr. Wishnatzki to release
the Nathel brothers from the guarantee; and (iii) the agreement of Mr.
Wishnatzki to the re-organization of ownership of the companies." The
Second Circuit declined to follow argued authority, distinguishing both
cases in which payments for the release of a guarantee were upheld as a
deductible loss under § 165(c)(2), despite multiple objectives for the
payment." The court ultimately held that the Nathel brothers did not
meet the burden of proving that their capital contributions were
primarily motivated to acquire a release from the bank loan guarantees.5 6
B.

Availability of Retroactive S CorporationElection Following a "Check
the Box" Conversion of a Partnershipto a Corporationin Revenue
Ruling 2009-15

Revenue Ruling 2009-15 offers an "escape hatch" from even one
day's status as a C Corporation prior to conversion to an S

48. Id. at *32.
49. Id. at *31.
50. Duke v. United States, No. 75 Civ. 5122, 1977 WL 1082, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,
1977); Shea v. Comm'r, 36 T.C 577, 582 (1961), affd, 327 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1964).
51. Austin v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 583, 584 (2d Cir. 1962); Ewing v. Comm'r, 213
F.2d 438, 439 (2d Cir. 1954).
52. Nathel v. Comm'r (Nathel 1), 131 T.C. 262, 268 (2008).
53. Nathel 11, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11244, at *36.
54. Id.
55. See Rushing v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 996, 1000-01, 1005 (1972); Comm'r v. Condit,
333 F.2d 585, 587-88 (10th Cir. 1964).
56. Nathel II, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11244, at *39-40.
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Corporation." One might ask, why is this important? Simply review
the mechanics of one of the two taxes assessed against an S Corporation
and you will understand this issue. Generally, I.R.C. § 1374 applies an
income tax on any net recognized "built-in" gain within an S
Corporation's recognition period, if it was a C Corporation prior to
making the S election after 1986." This ruling considers how to avoid C
Corporation status for even one day by avoiding the question of whether
a gain might exist at the date of conversion to S Corporation status."
Revenue Ruling 2009-15 considers two common scenarios
involving "check the box" conversions accompanied by an S Election. In
scenario one, an unincorporated entity classified as a partnership elects
under the "check the box" regulations to be taxed as an association as of
the first day of its tax year. 60 One month later, the association properly
files an election for the association to be taxed as an S Corporation,
requesting that the first day of the tax year be the effective date. All
persons deemed to be holding stock on the first day of the tax year are
also holding stock on the date of the election in this scenario. The
ruling indicates that on the day preceding the effective date, December
31 for a calendar year partnership, the partnership is "deemed" to have
exchanged all its assets and related debt for the stock.61 Immediately
after this deemed exchange, that same day, a fictional liquidation of the
partnership is considered to occur through which the stock is
distributed to the partners in their individual capacities. The result is
that the next day, January 1, the first day of the new tax year, only
individual partners will be shareholders of the corporation. This creates
the required eligibility for a retroactive S Corporation election. The
authority for these deemed facts can be found in § 301.7701-3(g)(1)(i)
and § 301.7701-3(g)(3)(i). 61 Without these fictional assumptions the
corporation would not be in compliance with Treas. Reg. §1.13626(a) (2) (ii) (B).63 Specifically, the retroactive application in the year of
the S election is permitted since the electing corporation qualifies as a
small business corporation with the requisite shareholders for the entire
57. Rev. Rul. 2009-15, 2009-21 I.R.B.
utIl/irb09-21.pdf.
58. I.R.C. H§ 1374(a), (c)(1) (2000).
59. Rev. Rul. 2009-15, 2009-21 I.R.B.
utl/irb09-21.pdf.
60. I.R.C. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(i).
61. Rev. Rul. 2009-15, 2009-21 I.R.B.
utl/irb09-21.pdf.
62. Treas. Reg. H§ 301.7701-3(g)(1)(i),
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.1362-6(a)(2)(ii)(B)

1035, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-

1035, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-

1035, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-3(g)(3)(i) (2006).
(2002).
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portion of the tax year. Since the partnership is converting in the same
year of the election, the deemed conversion on the day preceding the first
day of the tax year satisfies this condition. Retroactive application, to
the first day of the electing tax year, is achieved, and any intervening
short tax year as a C Corporation is avoided.
In scenario two, an unincorporated entity, classified as a
partnership for tax purposes, institutes a conversion to a corporate form
as required under the applicable state law, to be effective as of the first
day of its tax year. One month later, it also files an election to be taxed
as an S Corporation effective on the first day of the tax year. Similarly to
scenario one, after a deemed contribution of all net assets from the
partnership to the corporation on December 31, the partnership is
deemed liquidated on that same date. Simultaneously, the corporate
stock is deemed distributed in liquidation to its partners. This reaches
the same result as found in scenario one by which the resulting
corporation qualifies as a small business corporation for the entire tax
year and any intervening short tax year as a C Corporation is avoided.
C. Developments Impacting the Calculation of S CorporationBuilt-In
Gains Tax
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009
("ARRTA of 2009") amended I.R.C. § 1374's built-in gain recognition
period for tax years 2009 and 2 0 10 ." When a qualifying corporation
elects S Corporation status, its shareholders report a pro-rata share of its
income and loss. 65 The S Corporation is not subject to corporate tax
with the exception of two distinct tax assessments, one of which is the
built-in gains tax.6 6 As discussed above, liability for the built-in gains tax
generally only applies to some S Corporations that elected such status
after 1986 and existed as a regular C corporation before the election. 7
For an S Corporation to be subject to the built-in gains tax, it must have
a "net recognized built-in gain" during the "recognition period." 68
Generally, a net recognized built-in gain includes any gain during the
recognition period from the sale of any corporate asset owned at the
64. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1251,
123 Stat. 115, 342 (2009).
65. I.R.C. § 1361(b) (delineating the requirements needed to qualify as a "small
business corporation" eligible for an S Corporation election); Id. § 1366 (pass-thru of
items to shareholders).
66. Id. § 1374 (tax imposed on certain built-in gains).
67. Id. H§ 1374(a), (c)(1).
68. Id. § 1374(a).
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effective date of the S Corporation election, if it equals, or is less than,
the inherent gain existing in that asset at the effective date of the
election. 9 For the built-in gains tax to apply, the net recognized built in
gain must occur during the recognition period.70 Prior to ARRTA of
2009, the recognition period normally was ten years following the first
effective date of the S Corporation election.' For example, ignoring the
revisions in ARRTA of 2009, if the effective date of the first S
Corporation year is January 1, 2001, then the recognition period will not
expire until December 31, 2011. However, under the modifications of
ARRTA of 2009, if the eighth, ninth, or tenth year of the ten-year
recognition period falls in tax years beginning in 2009 or 2010, any net
recognized built in gains occurring in those years will not be subject to
the built-in gain tax.n1 Therefore, in my example with the first day of S
Corporation status effective on January 1, 2001, a net unrecognized built
in gain recognized in the tax year beginning in 2009 would not be
subject to the built-in gain tax since it is the ninth tax year of the tenyear recognition period.
1.

Valuation Considerationswith Built-In Gain Tax in Sales Among
Shareholders

The taxpayer in Ringgold Telephone Co. v. Commissioner owned onefourth of Cellular Radio of Chattanooga ("CRC") as well as a 7.385
percent effective interest in an entity, Chattanooga MSA Limited
This interest was derived through the
Partnership ("CHAT")."
taxpayer's ownership of CRC, which owned a 29.54 percent limited
partnership interest in CHAT." Ringgold elected S Corporation status
subsequent to being taxed as a C Corporation (effective on January 1,
In early 2000, based on a revised valuation report from
2000)."
Ringgold's CPA, the one-fourth ownership of CRC was valued at $2.6
million. However, an investment banker marketing the CRC interest

69. Id. § 1374(d)(3). A gain inherent as of the effective date of the election follows a
traditional calculation of the fair market value of the relevant asset as of the effective date
of the S election, reduced by the basis of that asset as of that date. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 1374(d)(7)(A).
72. Id. § 1374(d)(7)(B).
73. Ringgold Tel. Co. v. Comm'r, No. 22783-07, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 141, at
*2-4 (May 10, 2010).
74. Id.
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id. at *4-5.
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Having failed to enlist any
valued it at approximately $7 million.
CRC
and an effective owner of
of
owner
offers, BellSouth, a 25%
62.695% of CHAT, agreed to purchase the taxpayer's one-fourth interest
in CRC in early July of 2000.8 The sales transaction was negotiated in
July and completed in November of 2000 for approximately $5 million.79
All parties agreed that a built-in gain tax was properly owed by Ringgold
and should be calculated using the valuation of the CRC interest as of
the effective date of the S Corporation election (January 1, 2000)." The
amount of this valuation ultimately created the dispute in this case. The
taxpayer's 2000 tax return calculated the built-in gain tax using the
CPA's January 2000 valuation of $2.98 million." The IRS asserted that
the tax was properly calculated using a valuation of $5.22 million, which
was ultimately the sales' price paid by BellSouth for the CRC interest six
months later.82 The deficiency assessed was approximately $925,000,
with an additional I.R.C. § 6662(a) penalty of approximately $185,000.3
The "fair market value" standard examined by the court considered
the classic definition of fair market value to be the price to which a
willing buyer and a willing seller would agree when both parties are
motivated to obtain the best economic transaction and are aware of all
relevant facts while operating without any particular "compulsion to buy
or sell."" Although a full analysis of the methodology of both parties'
experts, in arriving at respective asserted fair market values, is beyond
the scope of this Article, a good review of this material can be found in
the decision." In assessing the importance of the actual sales price of
the CRC interest, as a measurement of the appropriate fair market value
for the built-in gains tax, the court considered several factors. First, the
court found that there should be no distinction in the values based on
the amount of time between the two valuation dates, since only six
months had expired and neither party presented evidence of intervening
events impacting the reliability of the January 2000 valuation.8 6 Second,
the court quickly concluded that as BellSouth was an unrelated buyer,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *5-6; see I.R.C. Hi 1374(d)(1), (7) (2000).
Ringgold, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 141, at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *8; see United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973); Estate of

Newhouse v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 193, 218 (1990).

85. Ringgold, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 141, at *9-18.
86. Id. at*19.
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and neither party contested the arm's length nature of the negotiations,
the valuation was acquired through an "arm's-length" arrangement
between the parties."
Ringgold argued it was entitled to a "lack of control" discount as a
matter of law in determining the appropriate fair market value of CRC."
The premise was that BellSouth would be inclined to pay a higher price
than actual fair market value to acquire Ringgold's minority interest in
CRC to preserve greater control of not only CRC, but also of CHAT,
particularly since BellSouth already had a controlling interest in CHAT.89
The Court rejected all asserted judicial precedent for this premise,
finding no incentive for BellSouth to pay a premium for the minority
interest in CRC, since BellSouth possessed majority control of CHAT
without any acquisition of the CRC interest from the taxpayer.o
Next, Ringgold asserted through expert testimony that BellSouth's
track record was to consistently offer the highest bid to forego the
likelihood of another owner exercising a right of first refusal.9 1
Arguably, this should impact the conclusive consideration of the sales
prices as the relevant fair market value between two parties under no
special compulsion to buy. This was considered relevant by the court as
a special circumstance possibly creating a higher fair market value than
might otherwise be negotiated between an objective buyer and seller."
Mr. King, the taxpayer's expert witness, carried much weight in this
conclusion with his experience in telecommunication industry
valuations, his involvement in numerous transactions involving
BellSouth, and his specific testimony that "once BellSouth determines
that a transaction is strategic it will 'do whatever it takes to win'
including submitting high bids to discourage exercises of any
outstanding right of first refusal."9 3 Since the other minority owners in
CRC (Bledsoe Telephone Company and Trenton Telephone Company)
had an enforceable first right of refusal, the court reviewed the sales
price not as a conclusive value, but rather as a value to be weighed with
Other evidence considered by the court
all the other evidence."
included Mr. King's detailed valuation methodologies and testimony, the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at *20.
Id. at *22.
Id.
Id. at *21-26.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *27-28.
Id.
Id. at *28.
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relevant business climate, the partnership structure, CRC's dividend and
capital call history, as well as an average of Mr. King's estimated CRC
values from a distribution yield analysis, a business enterprise analysis
and BellSouth's actual purchase price.95 The result was a finding of fair
market value at January 1, 2000 of $3.727 million."6 The court further
abated the assessment of § 6662(d) accuracy related penalties, finding
Ringgold had acted in good faith with reasonable reliance on its CPA's
advice and valuation for the built-in gains tax. 9
2.

Calculation of Built-In Gain Tax with I.R.C. § 481 Change in
Accounting Method

In MMC Corp. v Commissioner, Tax Court precedent interprets how
positive adjustments under an I.R.C. § 481 change in accounting method
impact calculation of § 1374 built-in gain tax."
Following the
amendment of § 475(c)(4) to eliminate a mark-to-market valuation of
accounts receivable, MMC Corp. was forced to convert to face-value
accounts receivable valuation and institute a $5.3 million § 481 positive
income adjustment to eliminate the duplication of prior deductions. 99 At
the time of its conversion from a C Corporation to an S Corporation on
January 1, 2000, two years remained for completion of the pro-rata
amortization of the § 481 positive adjustment.'"' The annual increase to
income for 2000 and 2001 was approximately $1.337 million.10 ' After
the conversion, these adjustments were made in 2000 and 2001,
increasing flow-through taxable income to the S Corporation
shareholders.0 2 MMC Corp. did not consider these amounts to be
subject to built-in gains tax. 0 3 The IRS assessed deficiencies, asserting
that this income was a net recognized built-in gain under §
1374(d)(5)(A). o0 Under this authority, income recognized during the
ten-year recognition period attributable to tax years prior to the effective

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at *28-29.
Id. at *30.
Id. at *28-30.
MMC Corp. v. Comm'r, 551 F.3d 1218, 1218 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1218, 1219-20.
Id. at 1219-20.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id.
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date of an S Corporation will be classified as built-in gain subject to the
tax.'io At the lower court level, the Tax Court agreed with the IRS. 106
The court's analysis first considered Treas. Reg. § 1.1374-4(d),
through which one must determine the item driving the I.R.C. § 481
positive income adjustment. 10 7 In this case, the taxpayer had previously
deducted $5.3 million of previously accrued income under the then
permissible mark-to-market valuation method of accounts receivable.'o
With the amendment of § 475(c)(4), requiring conversion to fair value
valuation, this deduction had to be recaptured as income.'' Under the §
481 amendments, as incorporated into the IRS Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998, all such adjustments must be recognized over a four-year
period."o To determine whether the ratable income adjustments in 2000
and 2001 pertained to the period preceding the S Corporation election,
the court considered the test imposed under Treas. Reg. § 1.13744(b)."' Specifically, if MMC Corp., as an accrual method taxpayer,
would otherwise have been required to include the recaptured 1997
conversion deduction in a tax year prior to its S Corporation election,
but for the legislated ratable allocation, then the recognized income
pertains to a pre-S corporation election period and is subject to the tax.
In this case, MMC Corp. would otherwise have been required to accrue
the $5.349 million deduction as income in 1998, prior to the S
corporation election, as this was the year the I.R.C. § 481(a) conversion
was legislated. Based on the test provided under the regulations and
prior Tax Court judicial precedents for similar treatment of § 481
income adjustments, recognized in the recognition period for built-in
gains, the Tenth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's decision."'

105. Id. at 1220-21. The deficiency for MMC for 2000 was $357,534 and for 2001
was $468,068. Id. at 1220.
106. See MMC Corp. v. United States, No. 14742-05, 2007 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 367,
at *6-12 (Nov. 29, 2007).
107. MMC Corp., 551 F.3d at 1221-23.
108. Id. at 1219.
109. Id. at 1220.
110. IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat 685
(1998).
111. MMC Corp., 551 F.3d at 1221.
112. MMC Corp., 551 F.3d at 1220-23.
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D. Final Regulations Impacting Classificationand Tax Basis of S

Corporation"Open Account" Debt to a Shareholder13
Final regulations were issued governing the definition of open
account debt, which significantly impact basis adjustments to debt owed
by an S Corporation to a shareholder under I.R.C. § 1367(b)(2)." 4
Revisions to the regulations were designed to prevent further Tax Court
decisions in which ambiguities of the definition of open account debt
produced results by which taxpayers appeared to be manipulating
classifications to avoid income recognition.'
1. HistoricalDevelopment PrecedingFinal Regulations
1.R.C. § 1367(a) for S corporations allows the pass-through taxation
of income and loss to the shareholder.116 This creates the regime by
which such owner's basis is increased for her proportionate share of
income or decreased for any such allocated loss. When the pass-through
character is that of a net loss, for such loss to be fully tax-deductible,
Subchapter S requires the shareholder to possess sufficient basis in her
stock or in any debt obligations owed to such shareholder by the S
Corporation to equal or exceed the amount of the allocated loss.' 17 The
ordering scheme of § 1367 requires the shareholder to first reduce the
basis of her S Corporation stock to zero in claiming allocated losses.118
Then, any remaining allocated loss will only be deductible to the extent
of the available basis of loans from the shareholder to the corporation."'
Once the basis of the debt owed to the shareholder is reduced by
allocated losses, basis restoration up to the original face value of the debt
will occur through priority allocation of "excess positive flow-through"
items. 20 Basis restoration for excess positive flow-through items is

113. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1367-2, -3 (2008).
114. Id.
115. See Brooks v. Comm'r, No. 8981-03, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 204, at *10-12
(Aug. 25, 2005); Cornelius v. Comm'r, 494 F.2d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 1974).
116. I.R.C § 1367(a) (2000).
117. Id. § 1366(d)(1). Subchapter S also requires that flow-through loss not only
meet the basis testing under § 1366(d)(1) to be deductible, but also meet the testing
parameters of § 469 (at-risk limitations) and § 465 (passive loss limitations). Id.
118. Id. § 1367(b)(2).
119. Id.
120. See id. "Excess positive flow-through items" is defined for purposes of this article
as the netted impact of the year's flow through items of taxable and nontaxable income
and gain, less nondeductible and deductible losses and deductions which create a net
One significant difference between stock basis
Id. § 1367(b)(2)(B).
increase.
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always first applied to any "reduced-basis" debt owed to the shareholder
at the beginning of the tax year. 12 Then, remaining unallocated excess
positive flow-through items can be used to restore the reduced basis of S

Corporation stock. 12 2
This regulatory development addresses the determination of when
open-account debt exists. The significance of classification of debt as
"open-account" relates to the methodology by which the basis of such
debt is calculated, thereby impacting income recognition with the
repayment of the debt.
Historically, this methodology differed
depending on whether the debt is an open-account debt, as compared to
a debt evidenced by a separate written instrument. This issue is relevant
for S corporations experiencing flow-through losses so large that they
reduce the shareholder basis in stock to zero, yet still have excess losses
which require additional basis from shareholder loans for such excess
losses to be deductible.
Debt used to establish basis has historically been derived from two
forms. One form is for debt to be formalized as an obligation which is
substantiated by a written promissory note. Alternatively, such debt
might be created as an "open account." The "open account" concept was
introduced in the 1994 regulations, defined simply as "shareholder
advances not evidenced by separate written instruments."'
Since the
1994 regulations were issued, it has been very common for owners of S
Corporations to delay income recognition on repayments of "reducedbasis" open account debt.
This occurred under the regulatory
methodology by which basis is calculated for such debt. Essentially, the
regulations authorized a "netting" of repayments, advances and "excess
positive flow through items" to arrive at a net increase or decrease of the
debt basis adjusted only at the end of the entity's tax year. 124 This
allowed manipulation of the transactions to assure that any repayment of
reduced basis debt would be offset by increases in basis during the same
tax year through either additional advances or positive adjustments. For
example, if on January 1, the open account debt has a face value of $1
million, yet a basis of zero, after use of such basis to deduct flowthrough losses, any repayment could be fully taxable. Yet, with open-

adjustments and debt basis adjustments results from the treatment of distributions.
Distributions made by an S corporation with respect to its stock reduce the stock basis of
a shareholder, but do not reduce debt basis. Id.
121. Id.
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.1367-2(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
123. Id. § 1.1367-2(a)(2).
124. Id.
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account debt, any later advances in that tax year could supplement
annual positive income adjustments to net in total as an offset of the
repayment. This methodology allowed avoidance of income recognition
with repayments on reduced basis debt.12 5 For example, consider the
facts in Table 1 which are modeled after an example in the final
regulations under § 1367(a)(2). These facts are modified slightly to
reflect the impact of complete repayment of the shareholder debt. Table
1 applies the regulatory basis calculations for shareholder debt
illustrating income recognition when open-account debt is used prior to
the issuance of the final regulations. As you will see from Table 1, prior
regulations applying the annual advance and repayment netting
methodology produced income recognition in two tax years ($1,500 in
2010 and $16,500 in 2013).
Table 1 - Example from Final Regulations
Calculation of Tax Consequences of Open Account Debt
with Reduced Basis
PRIOR TO FINAL REGULATIONS
[Assuming Facts for Illustration Purposes from Cited Regulations]

Transactions
**

to Basis Under
Reg. 1.1367-2(e) BEFORE

TImpact
Taxpayer A

Open Account
Transactions

MODIFIED BY FINAL REGS

_

Transactions occur

when Stock Basis
Zero
Beginning Balances
Loss allocation 2009 Basis of Debt Reduced

Face

Tax

Value

Basis

$16,000

$16,000
Basis Reduction to 50% of Face Value
-8 000

End of 2009

4/1/2010-Repayment
5/1/2010 Advance
Netted Decrease
2010
Ending Balance 2010

$1000
- 4,000
11000
-3,000
$l2i0

$8_00

Netted decrease in note of $3.000
triggers net gain of $1,500 since
basis of debt an End of 2009 =50% of
Note's Face Value.

-1.50
L2m

I

125. See Brooks v. Comm'r, No. 8981-03, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 204, at *14-15
(Aug. 25, 2005).
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2/1/2011 Repayment
3/2011- AdvanceNo formal note Adjusted Balance
- 12/31/2011
2/1/2012
Repayment
6/1-Advance
$50,000
9/1-Advance
$10,000
Netted Increase 2012
12/31-Loss
Allocation
Adjusted Balance 12/31/2012
2/1/2013
Repayment
ENDING
BALANCE

$ -5,000
20,000
$2

0

15000

57

Netted Increase in Note's Face Value
Increases Tax Basis by Net Increase-No
Gain Triggeredwith $5000 repayment
since transactionsare netted
Basis set at 76.786% of Face Value

L500
Netted Increase in Note's Face Value
Increases Tax Basis by Net Increase-No
Gain Triggered with $5000 repayment

-5,000
50,000
10000
55,000

55,000
-10,000

$831000

$Sd.500

-83,000

-66,500

0

-0

Netted Increase in Note's Face Value
Increases Tax Basis while loss
allocationdecreases basis Basis at
80.12% qf Face Value

Repayment Triggers Gain @ 19.88% of
$83,000 = $16,500

SUMMARY-GAIN
RECOGNITION with DEBT
REPAYMENT:
Tax Year - 2010
Tax Year-- 2013
TOTAL GALN RECOGNIZED

$ 1,500
$16500
$1800

Alas, however, let's review the impact of the final regulations.
2.

Final Regulations Effective for Advances OccurringAFTER the Effective
Date of these Final Regulations under I.R.C. § 1367(A) (2), October 20,
2008

Final regulations under I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2) establish a "bright-line"
rule as to what type of debt will qualify as an "open-account" debt.12 6

126. Treas. Reg. Hi 1.1367-2(a), (c)(2), (e). These regulations are effective for
advances occurring after October 20, 2008. However, if elected by the S Corporation
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Specifically, if the principal balance of an open account debt is greater
than $25,000 at the end of a tax year, the balance of that open account
debt is deemed a debt evidenced by a written instrument at the end of
the tax year and is no longer afforded the same basis adjustment
treatment as applied to an "open-account" debt.' 7 This occurs despite
the fact that it is not actually evidenced by a debt instrument of any
kind. The debt remains classified as such until it is repaid and
subsequent advances are considered to create a second debt."
The
second debt shall be classified as open-account unless evidenced by a
written instrument or until it ultimately exceeds threshold amounts of
$25,000 at the end of the S Corporation's tax year."' The regulations
establish an alternative testing date effective when a shareholder
surrenders ownership of the S Corporation, or at such time a disposal
occurs of the open account debt. 30 Here the testing date is at the
occurrence of either of these two events.' 3 '
Table 2 summarized in this Article, illustrates the tax consequences
of the facts of Table 1 as applied under these final regulations. As you
will see from Table 2, these same facts using the new threshold amount
limitations for open-account debt classification produced income
recognition with a shorter deferral period. In Table 2, income was
recognized in three tax years as follows: $1,161 in tax year 2012; and
then in 2013 with full repayment of both debts, $8570 on debt #1 and
$11,589 on debt #2.
Table 2 - Ex.-Table I IllustratingRevised Results Under Final
Regulations
Open

Account

TaxpayerA

Transactions

Face
Value

Tax
Basis

$16,000

$16,000

** Transactions
occur when Stock
Basis is Zero

Beginning Balances
Loss allocation-

Impact to Basis Under
FINAL Reg. 1.1367-2(e)

II

shareholders, the new regulations can apply to repayments on existing advances as of
October 20, 2008.
127. Id. § 1.1367-2(a)(2).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 1.1367-2(b)(2).
131. Id. § 1.1367-2(a)(3).
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2009 - Basis of Debt
Reduced
End of 2009
4/1/2010Repayment
5/1/2010 Advance
Netted Decrease
2010
Ending Balance
2010
2/1/2011 Repayment3/2011- AdvanceNo formal note
Adjusted Balance 12/31/2011

59

Basis Reduction to 50% of Face Value
$16Q

-8 000
$800
Netted decrease in note of $3,000
triggers net gain of $1.500 since basis
of debt an End of 2009 =50% of Note's
Face Value.

- 4,000
1,000
-1000

-1,500

$13,00

$6,1

-5,000
20000
15000
$2@QQ

M

Netted Increase & Note's Increase Face
Value Increases Tax Basis by Net
Amount- No Gain Triggered with
$5000 repayment since Balance @
12/31/2010 < $25.000- Basis at
76.786% of Face Value
BALANCE AT YEAR END > $25,000
SO DEEMED A DEBT EVIDENCED
BY
A
SEPARATE
WRITTEN
INSTRUMENT

DEBT #1
FACE TAX

VALUE BASIS

DEBT #2
FACE TAX

VALUE BASIS

Impact to Basis
Under

Reg. 1.13672(e)

OPEN ACCOUNT
DEBT #1

$28,000

$21,500

Since > 25,000 at
end of tax year
segregated as single
debt

2/1/2012 - Repayment o
$1000

-5,000

asis Reduced at
76.786% allocation
- Triggers Gain of
$1161

-3,839

ENDING BALANCE
2012

$23__Q

__

6/1/2012- Advance of
$50,000 - CREATES 2N
DEBT -Treated as
Open-Account if Not
Documented by Written
Note & Not > 25,000 at
Year End

__

Immediately treated
as SeparateDebt
SINCE Debt #1
Now DEEMED
substantiatedby
written instrument
$50,000
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9/1/2012 Advance of
$10,000 - Increases
Debt #2 through year-as
Open-Account.without
FormalDocumentation
Until Balance
Determined at Year End

560 000

Subtotal - Before Loss

60000

Allocation
12/31/2012 -LOSS
ALLOCATION OF
$15,000

AS OF END OF
TAX YEAR AT
12/31/2012

-

PROPORTIONATE TO
BASIS OF MULTIPLE
DEBTS
12/3 1/2012 BALAN'CE

>$25,000 - NO

-11.589
548.411
%60
000
$14.25Q
-3,411

$23QQQ0

2/1/2013 REPAYMENT
-60,000

-23,000
DF DEBT
ON
&
GAIN
BALANCE
REPAYMENT

18,7-50i$-0-

SUMMARY-GAIN RECOGNITION
with DEBT REPAYMENT:
Tax Year - 2012 -Debt #1
Tax Year - 2013 - Debt #1
Tax Year - 2013 -Debt #2
Tax Year - 2013- Debt #2

LONGER OPENACCT DEBT
Triggers Gain
Recogntion - Debt
#1 f $8,570 and
Debt #2 o
011589

$ 1,161
$ 8,750
11,589
$21.500

In summary, the implications of these revisions are an increased
administrative burden, although somewhat improved from the proposed
regulations, and likely to result in increased income recognition absent
thoughtful planning prior to the end of the tax year.
E.

Impact of Shareholder Guarantees on S CorporationBasis

If it has been a while since you studied basis calculation rules for S
Corporations you may want to review the simple Tax Court
memorandum case Weisberg v. Commissioner.132 It is truly amazing that
132. Weisberg v. Comm'r, No. 21157-07, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 55 (Mar. 22,
2010).
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the taxpayer expended the funds to litigate this case as the rules of tax
law applicable here are long settled. Nonetheless, he did and Weisberg
offers us a good review of the basics. Mr. Weisberg was the sole owner
of an S Corporation in which he ran his law practice.13 3 In early 2000,
the corporation obtained a $200,000 line of credit with the assistance of
Weisberg's personal guarantee.13 1 In 2003 the corporation experienced
losses, which approximated $199,000 that were deducted on Mr.
Weisberg's individual return. 3 1 Without providing the specific details,
we are left to assume from the opinion that Mr. Weisberg had no basis
remaining in his S Corporation stock as of the 2003 tax year.13 1 The
flow-through loss from the S Corporation was claimed on Weisberg's
individual income tax return, then promptly denied by the IRS who
alleged that he had no tax basis for claiming such loss.13 Citing the Tax
Court's language in a 1998 case later affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit,
the court reminds us (in the unlikely event we forget) that guarantees of
loans made by a non-shareholder creditor to the corporation do not
provide basis under I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1)(B).1'3 As stated artfully in the
1998 decision, there must be an economic outlay by the shareholder
with a "direct indebtedness between the corporation and its
Obviously, once the
shareholders" for the creation of basis.'3 9
shareholder is called to satisfy the promised guarantee, as occurred in
this case when Mr. Weisberg's guarantee was called in 2004, the
economic outlay then has occurred, with the corporation owing the
shareholder the liability paid on the corporation's behalf."
Unfortunately for Mr. Weisberg, that occurred in 2004, not in 2003 (the
year in which he needed sufficient basis to fully claim his prorated share
of losses). His mere status as a guarantor on the line of credit did not
create such basis. Lacking substantial authority to support his deduction
for these allocated losses and since the law was well settled in this area,
the court upheld the assessment of a twenty-percent accuracy penalty on
the 2003 deficiency under § 6662(a)."

133. Id. at *3.
134. Id. at *4.
135. Id. at *3-4.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *5.
138. Id. at *7.
139. Id. at *7; Spencer v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 62, 83-84 (1998), affd, 194 F.3d 1324
(11th Cir. 1999).
140. Weisberg, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 55, at *8.
141. Id. at *9-11.
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PARTNERSHIP ISSUES

A. Tax Court Interpretationof the "PerSe" Passive Classificationof
Limited PartnersFollowed by Similar PrecedentialAuthority in the
FederalCircuit of the United States Court of Appeals
A 2009 Tax Court decision, Garnett v. Commissioner," offers an
excellent planning opportunity for many advisors of entrepreneurs. In
tax years 2000 through 2002, the Garnetts were owners of various
agribusiness entities selling primarily poultry, eggs and hogs." These
entities were registered LLPs or LLCs, organized and operated under
In summary, the Garnetts owned directly 16.66% of
Iowa law."
Fremont Farms, 11.11% of Quality Poultry & Eggs, as well as Garnett
Family Farms LLC and Garnett Family Farms LLC I through IV ("GFF I
Each of the Garnett Family Farms LLCs owned minority
- IV")."
interests in other LLPs and LLCs.' 4 6 Mr. Garnett was managing member
of GFF I and GFF II, however the case reflects no evidence of who
managed the other LLCs.4 7 The partnership agreements allowed all
partners to participate in the active control and management of the LLP
businesses.'4 8 Iowa law provided that such partnerships would not bear
personal liability for LLP liabilities based on the statutory characteristics
of their role as a limited liability partner.'4 9 The IRS record reflects that
Mr. Garnett managed two of the three holding company LLCs, but not
the LLCs owned through the LLPs."o
For the tax years in question, the IRS disallowed deductible flowthrough losses, arguing that the ownership of these entities as partners
with limited liability, either through the LLCs or through the limited
liability partnerships, made Garnett a "per se" passive partner under
I.R.C. § 469(h)(2)."' As such, the Garnett's participation did not meet §
469-5T(e) requirements for active participation.'5 2 Specifically, a "per

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Garnett v. Comm'r, No. 9898-06, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18 (June 30, 2009).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *3-5.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *2-7.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10-12.
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se" passive partner under the regulatory guidance and prior IRS
enforcement guidelines is limited in which regulatory methods can be
used to document material participation. 53 Accordingly, the IRS denied
the Garnett losses as nondeductible passive losses under § 469, thereby
assessing deficiencies of over $360,000 in conjunction with the
assessment of substantial understatement penalties of over $72,000."'
The crux of the case rested on the court's interpretation of the
applicability of § 469(h)(2) (the "per se" passive rule) to limited liability
partners and limited liability company members. 5 Generally, §
469(a)(1) restricts the ability to deduct losses attributable to activities
deemed to be passive based on a determination that the taxpayer has not
materially participated in the activity under six objective tests
promulgated in § 469 regulations. 156 Specifically, the regulations under
§ 469 promulgate threshold objective tests by which it is determined
whether or not material participation has occurred.5 5 Generally, the
individual owner can satisfy the threshold test for active classification of
income or loss through meeting one of the following six tests: (i)
whether there is participation in the business activity of over five
hundred hours in a year; (ii) whether the actual participation in the
business activity amounts to substantially all of such actual participation
of any person during the year; (iii) whether there is at least over one
hundred hours of participation in the tax year by the taxpayer and it
exceeds any other person's activity during that period; (iv) whether the
taxpayer's total activity in all "significant participation activities" is over
five hundred hours and the activity in question is a significant
participation activity; (v) whether the taxpayer has materially
participated in such activity for at least five of the prior ten tax years; or
(vi) whether the taxpayer has materially participated for any three of the
prior tax years if such activity is a personal service activity.158 In
addition, there is a subjective facts and circumstances threshold, by
which the material participation threshold can be met with evidence
demonstrating there is regular, substantial and continuous participation
by the individual.'

153. See id. at *10.
154. Id. at *1-2, *35.
155. Id. at *9-10.
156. I.R.C. § 469(a) (2000).
157. See generally id. § 469.
158. Garnett, 2009 U.S. Tax. Ct. LEXIS 18, at *8-9; I.R.C. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(6)
(LexisNexis 2010).
159. Garnett, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18, at *9; I.R.C. § 1.469-5T(a)(7).
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Since the Garnetts owned their interests, as is common today via a
limited liability company or a limited liability partnership, the IRS
argued that the literal meaning of § 469(h)(2) controlled instead of the
broader material participation requirement defined as "regular,
continuous and substantial" participation under § 469(a)(1), as
determined under the application of the previously stated seven material
participation tests.1 0 Regulations interpreting this statute only allow a
limited partner the ability to trump the "per se" rule and establish
material participation for classifying income or loss as active income
under limited tests.16 ' Specifically, once the "per se" passive status is
deemed to apply, the partner can only avoid passive classification where
he/she has participated for at least five hundred hours in the activity or
has materially participated in five of the ten last prior years.162 If it is a
personal service activity the five year requirement drops to a three
consecutive prior tax year requirement to meet the material participation
threshold. 163
The rationale behind the "per se" passive rule is grounded in the fact
that when the passive rules were promulgated in 1986, limited
partnerships were the only form of flow-through limited liability entities
outside of S corporations and general partnerships. Since limited
partners were restricted from active involvement, yet limited liability
company members are not similarly restricted, the court considered that
Congress could not have considered the role of limited partners in
limited liability partnerships and members in limited liability companies
when § 469 was enacted.'" However, the court did not base its decision
in favor of the taxpayer on this premise.16 1 Instead, the court looked at
the "general partner exception" as defined in § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(ii) as an
exception to the "per se" rule of § 469(h)(2).'6 6 By doing so, the court
actually incorporated the substance of the historical differences in these
entities.167 Under the general partner exception, the passive "per se" rule
of § 469(h)(2) is not applicable where a person holds a general partner

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Garnett, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18, at *19.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(2); 53 Fed. Reg. 5726 (Feb. 25, 1988).
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a); 53 Fed. Reg. 5726.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(2).
Garnett, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18, at *14-15.
Id. at *14-23.
Id. at *23.
See id. at *22-23.
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interest throughout the year as well as a limited partnership interest.168
The actual statutory language of this regulation reads as follows:
(ii) Limited Partner Holding General Partner Interest - A partnership

interest of an individual shall not be treated as a limited partnership
interest for the individual's taxable year if the individual is a general
partner in the partnership at all times during the partnership's taxable
year ending with or within the individual's taxable year (or portion of
the partnership's taxable year during which the individual (directly or
indirectly) owns such limited partnership interest).169
The Tax Court concluded that the "general partner exception"
applied inherently to entities in which the legal structure allowed the
partner or member to actively manage the business without loss of their
in essence it considered the general partner
limited liability. 170
exception to be both a general partner rule and a limited partner rule.' 7 1
This judicial precedent in the Tax Court now provides substantial
authority for a broader classification of material participation. For
example, certain limited liability partners and LLC members owning
multiple interests, whose active participation was spread throughout
their various entities, were often denied the ability under prior
interpretations of the "per se" passive rule to classify their entity
activities as significant participation activities. Without the application
of the general partner exception, these partners and members were
considered limited partners and confined to only three of the material
participation tests listed above. Now, with the broader application of the
general partner exception by the Tax Court, there is a much wider
possibility that the partner's activities will qualify as materially
participating if the "significant participation activity" test is met.172 To
meet this test, the core business of such entities must be a trade or
business, the partner must participate at least one hundred hours in each
entity, and the partner's total participation in all such entities must be
more than five hundred hours.'7 3 This has a broader impact on
entrepreneurs who are actively involved in many businesses when
compared with those who spend more time in each.
The breadth of Garnett's judicial precedent has been expanded by
the Federal Circuit's decision to apply the Tax Court's narrow

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

I.R.C. §1.469-5T(e)(3)(ii) (2000).
Id.
Garnett, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18, at *22-30.
See id. at *29-30.
Id. at *9 (citing Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(4) (1988)).
Id. at *8.
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application of the "per se" passive loss rule. Just a month after Garnett
was decided, a United States Court of Federal Claims decision, Thompson
7
followed Garnett's rationale by determining that a
v. United States,"'
member in an LLC formed under Texas law should not be considered
akin to a "limited partner" where the taxpayer's interest in the entity is
analogous to that of a general partner."' The IRS acquiesced, in result
only, in Thompson that a membership interest in a limited liability
company is not a limited partnership interest as defined in Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3). 76 Between these two decisions, the North
Carolina tax practitioner can certainly be guided through the Tax Court
precedent, as well as the Federal Circuit, with confidence under similar
facts.
B.

Planning in the Worst of Times is Essential ... A Key Example of the
Need for the Tax PractitionerGuiding Clients Through Debt
Restructuring to be Aware of the Definition of a "PartnershipItem"
Under TEFRA

When facing the nightmare of debt workouts, either now, or back
in the 1990's, there are pitfalls at every turn. Bassing v. United States is a
classic example of how procedural rules can save the day where followed
carefully."' 1110 Bonifant LP was a Maryland limited partnership
formed in 1985 for construction of a Silver Spring office facility.178
Although it had several limited partners, the two general partners
(Charles Bassing and Richard Cohen) were the taxpayers. 179 The
partnership agreement included all the necessary deficit restoration
obligations, which became a relevant point as the partnership
encountered financial difficulty in the late 1980's.so A settlement
agreement was negotiated with the lender, in which the creditor
obtained the building in lieu of foreclosure accompanied by a payment
from one of the general partners (Mr. Cohen)."' Subsequently, the
partnership was liquidated, leaving Bassing with a deficit capital account

174. Thompson v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 728 (2009).
175. Id. at 738.
176. 2010-14 I.R.B. 3, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irblO-14.pdf.
177. Bassing v. United States, 563 F.3d 1280, 1284-85 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that
an action by Mr. Bassing to treat his release from a partnership as a cancellation of debt,
rather than a sale of his interest, was prohibited).
178. Id. at 1281.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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of approximately $883,000.182 As part of that settlement agreement, the
other general partner (Mr. Cohen) and the limited partners, in
conjunction with the creditor, agreed to give Bassing a full release of the
deficit restoration owed in February 1991 of $883,000.183 The taxpayer's
original 1991 individual income tax return, as filed on April 15, 1992,
reported a long term capital gain of the deficit amount, treating his
release from the obligation as a deemed sale of his partnership interest.
Only later did the taxpayer consider that due to his insolvency at the
time of the settlement, he should have characterized the release of this
obligation as cancellation of debt income under the insolvency
exclusion.185 The taxpayer filed an amended tax return, asserting this
position in late 2002, which would have re-characterized the income, yet
excluded most of it from taxation."' However, the claim was denied by
the IRS.187
This case does not consider the substantive merits of how the deficit
obligation should have been characterized. However, it does illustrate
how a failure to understand the partnership procedures as instituted
under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA")
can foreclose one's ability to resolve such possible mischaracterizations
for the benefit of the partners. In this decision, the Federal Circuit was
in agreement with the Federal Court of Claims that the taxpayer's refund
claim was barred under I.R.C. § 7422(h), since the taxpayer's refund
claim centered on a partnership item as defined in § 6231(a)(3). 88
Specifically, Bassing's deficit capital balance of approximately $883,000
must be calculated under an adopted accounting policy applying the
capital account maintenance rules. Accordingly, under Treas. Reg. §
301.6231(a)(3)-1(b) a partnership item includes: "[Tihe accounting
practices and the legal and factual determinations that underlie the
determination of the amount, timing and characterization of items of
income, credit, gain, loss, deduction, etc. . . ."1"' As a partnership item,
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 1281 (indicating that the 1991 release agreement was a comprehensive
negotiation among all the partners by which they defined their obligations to each other
after the settlement agreement and the partnership's liquidation).
185. Id. at 1281-82.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1282 (explaining how the government asserted that Mr. Bassing's claim was
barred by 26 U.S.C. § 7422(h), prohibiting "refund actions attributable to partnership
items").
188. Id. at 1282-83.
189. Id. at 1283 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(3)-1(b) (2010)).
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TEFRA instituted regulatory procedures assuring that partnership items,
such as this one, impact the partnership, therefore impacting its partners
and requiring handling at the partnership level for consistency.
Accordingly, the court found that Mr. Bassing's release of his deficit
restoration obligation was a partnership item requiring the partnership,
acting through its tax matters partner, not Mr. Bassing, to classify the
deficit and the settlement agreement's related impact pertaining to its tax
characterization.' 90 What occurred here was a failure to follow the
procedures afforded the taxpayer under 1.R.C. § 7422.191 Accordingly,
any action for a refund of taxes related to partnership items would be
handled under the authority of § 6228(b)(2). 192 Had the partnership's
tax matters partner filed an administrative adjustment request under §
6227(a) no later than three years after the date the partnership return
was filed, or the normal April 15 deadline, Bassing would have been led
down a happier path.193 It appears, in this scenario, that this deadline
could have been met at least through April 15, 1995, under the
procedures required of the tax matters partner under § 6227.194 Here,
the taxpayer (of course) was too late in figuring this out.
C.

Unique Case with a PartnerDetermined Not to be the Beneficial Owner
of his PartnershipInterest & Therefore Not Subject to Tax on His
DistributiveShare

Windheim v. Commissioner sets the scene for a family conflict of
unusual proportions in which the taxpayer was found not to be the
beneficial owner of his distributive share of partnership income from an
18.879-percent limited partnership interest in Martinique.' 95 Martinique,
a partnership owning New York real estate, was transferred to the
taxpayer from his father (Joseph Windheim) in 1976.196 Later in 1981,
shortly before his death, the father transferred his complete ownership
in another separate family business, Les Promotions Taillon Limitee
("Taillon"), to the taxpayer and the taxpayer's sister.'
The siblings'

190. Id. at 1284-85.
191. See id. at 1285 (resulting in the prohibition of Mr. Bassing's attempted refund
action by I.R.C. § 7422(h)).
192. See I.R.C. § 6228(b)(2) (2000).
193. See id. § 6227(a).
194. See id.
195. Windheim v. Comm'r, No. 23188-07, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 130, at *9
(June 10, 2009).
196. Id. at *2.
197. Id.
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joint management of the business was a disaster, resulting in the
taxpayer suing his sister in Canada, in the hope of a court-ordered
liquidation of Taillon to divide the assets between the two parties.'"
Following the sister's allegations that the taxpayer misappropriated
assets, the court denied the liquidation request."'9 Instead, the court
decided to divide the asset management responsibilities within Taillon
between the two parties.2 00 The taxpayer was to manage the securities
portfolio, while the sister was given the task of managing the real
estate. 20'
Needless to say, the disputes continued and the security
portfolio became worthless under the taxpayer's management. 202
Allegedly, the sister as well as the siblings' mother continued to use
Taillon's funds as a personal banking account, leaving the accounts
virtually devoid of any funds.2 0 3
The next skirmish among the siblings occurred when the taxpayer
learned distributions attributable to his ownership of Martinique were
made payable to him, but were issued to him in care of his mother. 0
These checks had been issued in such a manner in the past as well, and
were consistently delivered to his mother's address.205 In 1998 the
taxpayer sued the Toronto bank for honoring the prior endorsements of
these checks by his sister, who deposited the funds into Taillon's
account and immediately thereafter withdrew the funds.'
This led to
the mother instituting a lawsuit in New York to enjoin Martinique from
making distributions directly to the taxpayer."
As a result, the New
York court held in December 2000, that the original transfer of the
Martinique partnership interest to the taxpayer was solely for the
convenience of the father.20" Further, it held that the mother and sister
had an interest in the taxpayer's distribution checks.209 Yet, there was no
finding from the court as to who had a beneficial interest in the
Martinique partnership interest. However, the New York orders did
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

*3.
*3-4.
*3.

*2-4.
*5.
*4-5.
*4.
*5.
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direct Martinique to comply with the ultimate findings of the Canadian
judgment regarding the ultimate disposition of distributions from the
partnership.no
Finally in 2001, the Canadian court found the Toronto bank
negligent in honoring the forged endorsements that named the taxpayer
as owner of the distributions.2 1 The court ordered the Toronto bank to
pay the taxpayer, and directed the mother and sister to pay the Toronto
bank.2 12 The Canadian appellate court disagreed, based on a finding that
It reversed
the sister had the authority to authorize the bank's actions.
the lower court, yet still did not address who was the beneficial owner of
the Martinique partnership, as it was not a question raised by the nature
of the original pleadings in the negligence suit against the bank."
Attempts to take further action to recover the funds from the sister were
considered barred by the statute of limitations.
As if this conflict was not enough, the taxpayer had yet to face the
IRS. Windheim had been issued a Schedule K-1 (partner's share of
income, credits, deductions) for the four tax years in question (2000
through 2003), for which he did not even file tax returns.216 In
defending his failure to report this income, the taxpayer argued that
despite his legal title over the Martinique partnership interest, he was
not the beneficial owner of the partnership interest as he had no control
over it.21 7 The court considered various precedents to determine the
extent of his beneficial ownership, considering the extent of his control
over economic benefits, his inability to dispose of the asset, the
assignment of obligations, the risk attached to him with respect to the
asset, and the extent to which he could handle or be involved with the
asset.218 Considering these factors, the Tax Court found that the

210. Id.
211. Id. at *6.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *6-7.
215. Id. at *6-7.
216. Id. at *7.
217. Id. at *8.
218. See id. at *8 (citing Hang v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 74, 80 (1990) (actual command or
enjoyment from economic benefits); Ragghianti v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 346, 349 (1978),
affd, 652 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1981) (determining ownership based on the person having
the largest amount of possession); Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221,
1237-38 (1981) (looking to all relevant factors, including receipt of economic benefits,
control over selling assets, impact of obligations and risks associated with assets, and
how the parties involved handle the particular asset)).
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taxpayer had no ability to direct or control the disposition of the
partnership interest.219 The taxpayer was effectively restrained from
transferring his partnership interest due to the continuing New York
order, by which a constructive trust was created over the Martinique
distribution checks until the Canadian lawsuit was resolved.220 It also
influenced the Tax Court that the Canadian judgment was overturned in
favor of the mother and sister, and that the taxpayer was forced to
abandon any further attempts to win control over the Martinique
distributions. This succession of events, through which the taxpayer
tried to recover beneficial ownership, were the only times the court
considered him to have any inkling of beneficial ownership. Yet
virtually no economic benefit accrued to him during all the years in
question. 221 After a finding that he was not the beneficial owner of the
interest, the taxpayer was not required to report his distributive share of
partnership earnings.222 Good result for the taxpayer, but quite a rocky
path to victory against the IRS!
D.

Review of the Methodology of Income Characterization for Liquidating
Partnersfrom a Service Partnership

In Wallis v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was a retiring tax lawyer
from Holland & Knight, a Florida limited partnership.223 Having served
as a Class B principal equity partner in the firm for twelve years, the
taxpayer converted to a Class C (non-ownership) partner and shortly
thereafter retired from the firm. 224 The firm provided Wallis with a
schedule of benefits to be paid, consisting of approximately $98,000 of
Schedule B regular capital withdrawal benefits and $240,000 of Schedule
C unit benefits. 225 Schedule C units were awarded to the Class B capital
partners annually regardless of firm profits, yet these amounts were not
reserved to the partner's benefits and they were forfeited generally with a
The partnership had reported these
departure from the firm.226
payments through Form 1099-MISC in the following increments: 2003 $60,000; 2004 - $80,000; 2005 - $80,000; and 2006 - $20,000; for a total

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
2009).
224.
225.
226.

Id. at *9.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *13-14.
Wallis v. Comm'r, No. 8818-08, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 245, at *3 (Oct. 27,
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *5.
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of $240,000 reported through Form 1099s over the four year period of
Additionally, Mr. Wallis was paid the following
benefit payout.?2
amounts for liquidation of his capital account according to the benefit
schedule from the firm: 2003 - $24,540; 2004 - $32,720; 2005 - $32,720;

and 2006 - $8,180; for a total of $98,160.2' Reviewing the Schedule KIs, reported through the partnership for Mr. Wallis for his entire
employment as a Class B equity partner, the IRS calculated his
partnership basis at the time of his withdrawal to be $399.229
Originally failing to report any of the 2005 payments as income,
Wallis conceded for the 2005 tax year audit (which is the only year in
question in this case) that the $80,000 receipt of Schedule C unit
payments should be reported as income.230 What he did contest,
however, was the characterization of such Schedule C payments. Wallis
asserted that they were not properly classified by the IRS as ordinary
income, but instead should be considered liquidating payments taxable
as consideration for the sale or exchange of a capital asset.23 ' The court
considered statutory authority by which payments to retired partners are
classified either as: (i) distributive shares of income; 232 (ii) guaranteed
payments;m or (iii) payments received in exchange for partnership
Considering the 1992 elimination of the firm's retirement
interests.
plan and the evidence that Schedule C units were not considered an
allocated portion of partnership income or property, nor derived from
the taxpayer's capital account, the court interpreted these payments to
be paid from future earnings of the partnership after the partner's
23
With classification as partner retirement benefits, the
retirement.
on
precedential authority in Sloan v. Commissioner23 ' and
relied
court
Treas. Reg. §1.736-1(a)(2) to determine that retirement payments to a

227. Id. at *12.
228. Id. at *9-13, *25.
229. Id. at *25. The basis calculated by the IRS simply followed the Schedule K-1
reporting, with total capital contributions of $111,756 increased by Wallis's total
distributive share of taxable income of $2,780,394 and of tax-exempt income of $422,
which was then reduced by total distributions to Wallis of $2,892,173. Id. The sum of
these values equals $399.
230. Id. at *2.
231. Id. at *15.
232. I.R.C. § 736(a)(1) (2000).
233. Id. § 736(a)(2).
234. Id. § 736(b).
235. Wallis, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 245, at *18.
236. Wallis, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 245, at *18; see also Sloan v. Comm'r, 42
T.C.M. (CCH) 1606 (1981).
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liquidating partner are deemed guaranteed payments. 23 The taxpayer
relied on language from the partnership agreement by which the
partner's interest value is the combination of the Schedule C units and
the capital account. 3 8 Accordingly, the taxpayer asserted that the
Schedule C units were amounts received in exchange for his partnership
interest to be taxed as a capital gain 239 asserting that the regulations
consider an arm's length agreement as to valuation of a partnership
interest to be correct. 2 ' The court rejected this argument, asserting
further regulatory interpretation that payments to partners who are
withdrawing can constitute several items. 24 1 As such, allocations must
be characterized distinguishing among payments for different types of
partnership assets, as well as other payments. 24 2 With the firm's
schedule of benefits allocating between Schedule C unit payments and
the capital account payments, combined with the firm's reporting of the
Schedule C unit payments on Form 1099, as well as the regulatory
characterization of liquidating payments to include guaranteed
payments, and the judicial precedent finding partner retirement benefits
analogous to guaranteed payments, the court held that the Schedule C
unit payments were taxable as guaranteed payments.24 3
The IRS also alleged that the 2005 capital liquidation payments of
$32,720 were fully taxable as capital gains, since such payments
exceeded their calculated partner's basis of $399."

The success of this

assertion hinged on the court's acceptance of this basis as determined
from the cumulative Schedule K-1 reporting.2 45 Given the taxpayer's
submission of partnership schedules used by the firm to establish the
partner's capital eligible for liquidation payments, which support the
taxpayer's assertion of a total basis of $98,162 and its conflict with the
Schedule K-i tax reporting by the firm, the court considered the benefit

237. Wallis, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 245, at *19.
238. Id. at *20-21.
239. Id. at *24-25.
240. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(1) (2009).
241. Wallis, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 245, at *21-22.
242. Id. at *22; Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(2).
243. Wallis, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 245, at *21-22.
244. Id. at *24-25.
245. Id. at *15; see also Sloan v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1606 (1981). Gain or loss
on partnership dispositions is recognized to the recipient where cash distributions
exceed such partner's basis prior to the distribution. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (2000).
Generally, no gain will be recognized until the basis is fully reduced by total payments,
except where the partner receiving fixed payments elects to pro-rate basis among all
payments. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(6) (2009).
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payment schedule likely to have been prepared more carefully given the
firm's interest in its correctness.24 ' Further, the court emphasized the
IRS's failure to address the discrepancies with a rationale to support their
assertions, as the basis to hold that the IRS had failed to meet the
preponderance of evidence burden of proof.247 The result to Wallis was
the avoidance of capital gains tax on the capital equity payments for
2005, as they were treated as return of the greater basis, as reflected on
the partnership schedules, instead of the IRS calculations from
cumulative Schedule K-1's. 48
As an interesting final note with respect to the assessment of I.R.C.
§ 6662(a) accuracy related penalties,24 9 Wallis was forced to pay this
penalty on underpaid tax attributable to the IRS reclassification of
Schedule C unit payments as guaranteed payments from this decision.5 o
This Author finds it hard to disagree with the court on this point.
Specifically, the partnership reported the Schedule C unit payments on
Form 1099-MISC, giving notice to the taxpayer, a tax lawyer, of a
treatment inconsistent from what he reported on his tax return. There
just is not a more classic example illustrating when Form 8082 should
be filed for notification to the IRS of inconsistent return reporting to
avoid the § 6662(a) accuracy related penalty. Needless to say, Mr.
Wallis learned the hard way!
III. EXTENSIONS OF THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO SIX YEARS
WHEN BASIS OVERSTATEMENTS UNDERSTATE INCOME OF PARTNERSHIPS OR
S CORPORATIONS

A. Introductory Comments for the Practitioner
I.R.C. § 6501(a) requires that the IRS assess income tax deficiencies
against a taxpayer within a three-year period after the filing of an income
tax return.21 There are ten statutory exceptions to the application of the
three-year statute of limitations, with the four most relevant ones
including: (i) when the IRS and the taxpayer agree to extend the time for
246. Wallis, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 245, at *26-27.
247. Id. at *27.
248. Id. at *25.
249. I.R.C. § 6662 (imposing a 20% penalty on tax underpayments that are deemed
substantial, because they are greater than the larger of $5,000 or 10% of the tax required
to be reported on a tax return with the tax underpayment).
250. Wallis, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 245, at *29-30.
251. 1.R.C. § 6501(a).
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assessment;252 (ii) when no return is filed;253 (iii) when a fraudulent
return is filed by a taxpayer intending to avoid tax; 254 and (iv) when
required information regarding a listed transaction has not been
included in the filing of a return.5 Section 6501(e)(1)(B) is another
statutory mechanism by which the IRS can extend the normal three-year
statute of limitations period for assessing income tax deficiencies to a
six-year period if certain omissions of gross income occur on a return.5
The extended period is triggered when a taxpayer omits gross income
equal to or greater than 25 percent of the gross income actually reported
on the return.2 57 Simply applied, if a taxpayer's return reports $500,000
of gross income, yet omits $150,000 of gross income, 25% of gross
income reported ($125,000) has been exceeded and the three-year
statute is extended to six years.
Currently, § 6501(e)(1)(B) offers two exceptions from the trigger
extension of the statute of limitations with certain omissions of
income.25" The first exception applies where the taxpayer is reporting
gross income derived from the sale of goods or services generated in a
trade or business. Specifically, in such a trade or business the statute
classifies a "gross income" omission to be solely an omission of "gross
receipts" and not an omission of "gross income" (as derived when
reducing gross receipts or sales by cost of goods sold).2 59 This statute
clearly indicates that the extended six-year statute of limitations shall
not apply where the gross income omission is derived from the
overstatement of cost of goods sold, thereby creating an understatement
of reported gross income from the trade or business.
Yet, where gross
252. Id. § 6501(c)(4).
253. Id. § 6501(c)(3).
254. Id. § 6501(c)(1).
255. Id. § 6501(c)(10). This section is effective for tax years with respect to which the
period for assessing a deficiency did not expire before October 22, 2004. American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §
6501(c)(10)).
256. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B) was the successor to I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A), as the statute
was reordered by the 2010 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No.
111-147. The cases discussed in Section III refer to the prior statute (I.R.C. §
6501(e)(1)(A)), which now is I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B).
257. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i).
258. Id. § 6501(e)(1)(B).
259. Id. § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i); Colony Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 30 (1958). See Form
1040, Schedule C for reporting profit or loss from a business by which "gross receipts" as
reported on Part 1, Line 1 is reduced by returns and allowances as well as by cost of
goods sold to calculate "gross income" on Part 1, Line 7.
260. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010

37

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2

76

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:39

receipts are sufficiently understated and cost of goods sold is properly
reported, this omission of reported income can result in the application
of the six year statute of limitations where the 25% omission threshold is
met. 261 A second exception from the extended statute period is granted
where the tax position generating the omission of gross income has been
adequately disclosed either in the tax return or in an attachment.26 2
Whether the return adequately discloses the position by which an
omission of gross income occurs depends on whether the disclosures are
reasonably sufficient for the IRS to be aware of the "nature and amount"
of the omitted item. 2 63 This will vary on a case-by-case basis and is best
considered under the relevant facts and circumstances.
Since 2008, there have been a significant number of judicial
decisions issued interpreting when the exception to the three-year
statute triggered by an omission of income applies under § 6501(e)(1) as
codified in those relevant tax years prior to 2010. It is important at this
juncture to point out to the reader that § 6501(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(A)(i),
and (e)(1)(B) were re-ordered under the 2010 Hiring Incentives to
Restore Employment Act to accommodate an addition to § 6501(e). For
the purposes of issues discussed in Section III, the same provisions
found in the predecessor § 6501(e)(1)(A) in 2009 will be used to
reference these topics in discussing the cases to allow the reader
consistency in reviewing the case citations. See Appendix I to this Article
for a comparison of § 6501(e) as applied in the cases to § 6501(e) as
amended in 2010.264
The cases discussed in this Article have occurred in Tax Court, in
the Federal Circuit, and in various other circuits, including the Fourth
Circuit. As one might expect, the proliferation of these cases can be
attributed to litigation winding through the audit process involving the
various iterations of tax shelter strategies which incorporate the use of
artificially high basis for tax avoidance. 65 These judicial developments

261. Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i).
262. Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii).
263. Id.
264. 2010 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147. The reordering of the statute was to accommodate the addition of a definition of omitted gross
income from one or more assets to which information reporting is required for reporting
foreign financial information under I.R.C. § 6038(d). The cases discussed in Section III
refer to the prior statute (I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)), which now is I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B).
265. New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 132 T.C. 161 (2009);
Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch III), 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Beard v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 95 (2009); Highwood Partners v. Comm'r, 133 T.C.
1 (2009); Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. 60 (2009); 3K Inv.
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illustrate the impact of these types of transactions on the application of
the six-year extended statute of limitations under § 6501(e)(1)(B).2 6 6
But, more importantly, they emphasize the zeal with which the IRS is
attacking egregious tax planning in its attempt to recover significant tax
deficiencies. The IRS has chased these transactions with arguments that
they represent sham transactions without economic substance, business
purpose, nor economic effect.267 Exhibiting the fury of "Roman soldiers,"
the IRS attempted to topple these transactions as different forms of the
abusive "Son-of-Boss" tax avoidance structures. Yet, for the last eighteen
months, what has been relevant in the actual case development in this
area is that, often, the IRS's dogmatic pursuit begins too late under the
statute of limitations assessment restrictions of § 6501(a).2 68 Suffice it
to say that, in most of these cases, what appeared to be possibly
substantial arguments against the economic substance of "inflated basis"
technical wizardry became moot. Moot simply because, without
interpretation of § 6501(e)(1)(A) in light of the "tax wizardry" of the
new millennium, the old standards used to define "omissions of income"
and allow an even-playing field between the IRS and the cunning tax
practitioner appear insufficient. As you will see in the strategies
challenged in these cases, the IRS uncovered deficiencies created
through the use of partnerships too late to assess deficiencies of income
items on the reporting partnerships under a final partnership
administrative adjustment ("FPAA"), without an extended statute
period.2 69 This set the stage for a plethora of cases, several of which are
discussed herein, in which the substantive technical issues were not
dissected under the focus of appellate analysis. Rather, the analysis
focused on whether jurisdiction existed to assess the tax deficiency
The IRS has
within an extended statute of limitations period.
consistently (albeit with a few exceptions) failed in its arguments to
broaden the interpretations of what constitutes an "omission of income"
under § 6501(e)(1)(A) to extend the three-year statute to six years.2 70
Partners v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. 112 (2009); Blak Invs. v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. No. 19 (2009);
see also Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r (Bakersfield II), 568 F.3d 767 (9th
Cir. 2009); Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States (HCS 1), 599 F. Supp. 2d 678
(E.D.N.C. 2008).
266. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B).
267. Salman Ranch III, 573 F.3d at 1365.
268. 1.R.C. § 6501(a).
269. Bakersfield II, 568 F.3d at 767; HCS I, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 678.
270. I.R.C. H§ 6501(e)(1)(A), 6229(c)(2); see AD Global Fund, LLC ex rel. N. Hills
I.R.C. §
Holding, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
6229(c)(2) in conjunction with 1.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) asserts a period for assessing tax
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Considering the arguments from the courts as discussed in this Article,
one cannot help but realize that the policy issues in the 1950's, used to
decide when the statute of limitations should be extended under §
6501(e)(1)(A), are quite antiquated in light of today's sophisticated tax
strategies. Just as the "sword" of Circular 230 had to be sharpened to
enforce the ethical challenges of today's tax practice,2 7' so too does the
underlying policy asserted for § 6501(e)(1)(A), as originally premised
on section 275(c) from the Revenue Act of 1934, appear to need
"sharpening."272 Reading Colony, which is cited in all of the inflated basis
cases, the review of the legislative history of the predecessor statute for §
6501(e)(1)(A) feels like a review of a time capsule. That is . .. long ago
and far away in another galaxy . . our Senate Finance Committee
members could never have dreamed of short-sale transactions, in
conjunction with manipulation of ambiguous Subchapter K basis rules,
governing basis reduction, with a partner's "contribution" of assets
subject to contingent liabilities, followed by entity restructuring under a
§ 754 election used primarily to inflate the inside basis of partnership
assets about to be sold for millions.27 Yes, as considered by the senators
in the 73rd Congressional Session and considered as relevant legislative
history in Colony, the senators expressed concern that section 276's
extension of the statute of limitations "not be kept open indefinitely in
the case of an honest but negligent taxpayer," as it was believed that "a
taxpayer who makes an honest mistake" would be treated unfairly where
the statute was held open "indefinitely," such as when a "taxpayer failed
to report a dividend because he was erroneously advised by the officers

on the partners, which is attributable to any reported partnership item that expires on
the later of three years after the partnership return is filed or three years after the last day
for filing the tax return without considering extensions. Given the complexity of these
transactions, absent extension of this assessment period by agreement of the parties
under I.R.C. § 6229(b), or absent the ability to prove that a partner has, with the intent
to evade tax, signed or participated directly or indirectly in preparation of the
partnership return, including a false or fraudulent item under I.R.C. § 6229(c), an
omission from gross income as described in I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (25% or more of the
gross income as reported) is the primary way in which the IRS could successfully assert
an extended six-year statute for assertion of the assessment on the individual partners in
the tax years in question.
271. See Jeffrey H. Paravano & Melinda L. Reynolds, The New Circular230 Regulations
- Best Practices or Scarlet Letter?, BNA Tax Management Memorandum (August 22,
2005),
available
at
http://www.utahbar.org/sections/taxlaw/assets/
Evan B. Hoffman, Comment, IRS Circular 230 and
circular230_regulations.pdf;
ProfessionalDisciplinefor Firms, 43 Hous. L. REv. 1241, 1243 (2006).
272. Colony Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 35 (1958).
273. Bakersfield II, 568 F.3d at 769; HCS 1, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
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of the corporation that it was paid out of capital[,1 or he might report as
income for one year an item of income which properly belonged in
another year."" Oh, but if that was only the biggest worry of today.
As you review this section's judicial case developments, which are
lining up in all possible appellate paths a tax practitioner might choose,
consider the issue of the extension of the statute of limitations as highly
relevant both in and outside the context of an abusive tax shelter. Let us
be clear, the IRS will continue to chase recovery of "tax gap" 7 dollars.
Specifically, given the number of cases lost by the IRS on this procedural
issue, they boldly issued retroactive temporary regulations in late 2009,
attempting to override the decisions of the Tax Court and several of the
United States Court of Appeals. Rumblings from the professional world
quickly surfaced as to the validity of these regulations, alluding to the
use of improper procedures. One case has already considered the issue
and is discussed in this Article. The likelihood of further litigation
seems assured, if only to determine the enforceability of the regulations
in light of the IRS's "never-give-up" attitude to recover significant tax
dollars evaporating in these "inflated basis" planning transactions.
B. Tax Court's Dispute with the IRS over Interpretationof I.R.C. §
6501 (e) (1)(A)'s Extension of the Three-Year Statute of Limitations to
Six Years with a Tax Basis Understatement
As we begin a review of two Tax Court cases, Beard v.
Commissionern6 and UTAM, Ltd. v. Commissioner,277 interpreting the
applicability of an extended statute of limitations involving inflated basis
transactions, we will consider the Tax Court's interpretation of legal
precedent applying the extended statute of limitation under I.R.C. §
6501(e)(1)(A) in contrast to the IRS's broader interpretation. The crux
of both positions begins with the 1958 Supreme Court decision in
274. Colony, 357 U.S. at 35.
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
Gap,
the
Tax
275. Understanding
0,,id=137246,00.html (last visited June 30, 2010). Based on FS-2005-14, the tax gap
widely discussed by the IRS is defined to include unpaid tax liabilities derived from: (i)
failure to file tax returns; (ii) failure to completely report all taxable income, the
overstatement of taxable deductions and the improper claiming of tax credits, all of
which lead to the underreporting of tax liabilities; and (iii) failure to pay tax liabilities
reflected on filed tax returns at all, or at least on a timely basis. Id. As reported on
March 29, 2005, the gross tax gap estimated on 2001 data approximates $353 billion.
I.R.B. 2005-38, availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb05-38.pdf.
276. Beard v. Comm'r, No. 13372-06, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 185 (Aug. 11,
2009).
277. UTAM, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258 (Nov. 9, 2009).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010

41

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2

80

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:39

Colony, which interprets the predecessor section to § 6501(e)(1)(A)."'
The Court's interpretation of Colony permeates all these cases. Both
Beard and UTAM, Ltd. also incorporate the rationale of Bakersfield I,279 a
Tax Court decision upheld in the Ninth Circuit in June 2009. Since
Beard is on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, 80 and UTAM, Ltd. is still
appealable to the D.C. Circuit281 at the time of submission of this Article,
there is a potential for disagreement with the Bakersfield 1I Ninth Circuit
on the horizon, which will likely surface along with the debate over
validity of the IRS's newly issued retroactive regulations.
In Beard, the taxpayer acquired treasury notes from a short sale and
sold them to an unrelated third party to generate $12.16 million.28 2
Shortly thereafter, Beard acquired more treasury notes in amounts of
$5.7 million and $6.46 million, which were immediately transferred into
his two S Corporations of which he owned a seventy-six percent
majority control. 28 3 Also transferred in with the investments were his
short positions, thereby obligating the S Corporation to close the
original short sale through acquiring replacements of the borrowed
securities."' Ultimately, the S Corporations closed the positions and
only four days later did the taxpayer sell his interests in the S
Corporations to an unrelated party for $6.6 million and $7.6 million.
The IRS's notice of deficiency alleged that the taxpayer overstated his
basis in the S corporations by increasing the basis for the contributed
treasury stock, yet failing to reduce such basis by the obligation assumed
by the S Corporation to close the stockholder's short position. 28 6 The
alleged inflated basis was $5.7 million and $6.46 million respectively for
a total increase to the reported $1.4 million gain on the S Corporations'
sales of $12.16 million.8 7 The issue decided in this decision was not a

278. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958).
279. Bakersfield II, 568 F.3d at 771-76.
280. The record on appeal was mailed to the Clerk of U.S Court of Appeals for the 7th
Circuit on December 4, 2009.
281. UTAM, Ltd., 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258, at *10. Respondent's motion to
vacate & reconsider was denied by the Tax Court with order entered on May 19, 2010,
triggering the ninety-day period for an appeal to be filed. Id. The status of the appeal
was unknown at the time of this Article's submission.
282. Beard v. Comm'r, No. 13372-06, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 185, at *2 (Aug. 11,
2009).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at *3.
287. Id. at *1-4.
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debate on the merits of the deficiency. Instead, the taxpayer challenged
the issuance of the deficiency notice in 2006 after the expiration of the
three-year statute of limitations. 288 On a motion for summary judgment,
the essence of Beard's assertion was that the three-year statute had
expired prior to the deficiency assessment and the six-year extended
statute was not applicable since there had been no omission from gross
income as required for § 6501(e)(1)(A) to apply to extend the statute.
Specifically, Beard asserted that § 6501(e)(1)(A) should be construed by
its specific language, which requires an omission of gross income which
was not applicable since amounts received for the sale of corporate stock
had not been omitted.2 90 Rather, there had been an overstatement of the
basis used to reduce the amounts received to the gain from the sale.2 9'
Relying then on language contained within an exception to §
6501(e)(1)(A),2 92 Beard argued that without an omission of amounts
received or accrued from the sale then, the overstatement of basis did
not constitute an omission of gross income.
The Tax Court in Beard reviewed the underlying legal issues
interpreting § 6501(e), beginning with the 1958 Supreme Court
precedent in Colony,294 as it interpreted § 275(c) in the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code (the predecessor statute to § 6501(e)(1)(A)). 295 Colony
held that specific income receipts or accrued income must have been
"left out" in computing gross income for an "omission of income" to
trigger measurement of the amount of the omission for possible
extension of the statute of limitations. 2 96 The transaction in Colony
involved the taxpayer's sale of inventory of subdivision lots.2 97 The IRS
has consistently argued that the Supreme Court's 1958 decision in
Colony should only apply to cases with taxpayers generating gross

288. Id. at *3-4.
289. Id.
290. Id. at *5.
291. Id. at *13
292. 1.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) (LexisNexis 2010).
293. Beard, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 185, at *8.
294. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958).
295. 1.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) was the predecessor to I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B), prior to
the reordering of I.R.C. § 6501(e) by the 2010 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment
Act, Pub. L. 111-147. The citations in the cases discussed in Section III refer to the prior
statute as I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A). For purposes of discussion in this Article, citations
refer to the current reordered version of I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A), which now is 1.R.C. §
6501(e)(1)(B).
296. Colony, 357 U.S. at 35-36.
297. Id. at 30.
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receipts from sales or services in the course of a trade or business.298 Since
Beard involves the overstatement of basis in the sale of corporate stock,
it is the IRS's position that the Colony holding is not controlling.29 9
The crux of the IRS argument was centered on the premise that
Colony's analysis of section 275(c) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code is
to be distinguished from interpretations of § 6501(e) as codified in the
1954 code, as the latter is materially different.oo In examining the 1958
Colony decision, only two references are made to the 1954 codified §
6501(e)(1)(A). First, the court simply references the existence at the
time of the decision of a new codification of this statute, followed by
only one further reference in the last sentence of the decision, stating
that Colony's holding is in congruence with the unambiguous language of
the newly codified § 6501(e)(1)(A), as codified in the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code.3 01 It is clear that Colony did not attempt to construe the
1954 codification in any manner.30 2 However, the IRS argued its premise
as follows:
(1) § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the 1954 code ("the 25% omission rule"), labeled
"general rule," is just that, a broad general rule that an omission of gross
income, properly includible in the return, which exceeds 25 percent of
gross income stated on the return, will extend the statute of limitations
to six years.
(2) Clause (i) of § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the 1954 code 303 ("the trade or
business gross receipts test") defines how to calculate gross income used
for the 25% omission rule in subparagraph A. Specifically, the clause
provides that gross income derived from a trade or business is defined as
amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services without
reduction for the cost of such goods or services.
(3) Even though § 275(c) of the 1939 code, as interpreted in Colony,
has identical language to the 25% omission rule, Colony essentially
applied the rule embodied in the trade or business gross receipts test to
the Colony facts - facts involving taxpayers receiving gross receipts for
298. Beard, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 185, at *9; see also Bakersfield Energy
Partners, LP v. Comm'r (Bakersfield II), 568 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2009); Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States (HCS 1), 599 F. Supp. 2d 678, 683 (E.D.N.C.
2008); Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch III), 573 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Highwood Partners v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. 1 (Aug. 13, 2009).
299. Beard, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 185, at *8-11.
300. Id. at *10.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. 1.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i) (1954) (including the "trade or business gross receipts
exception").
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residential lots sold in the trade or business. Therefore, the IRS argues
that Colony's holding should be limited in application as a special
definition of gross income only applicable as stated in the trade or
business gross receipts test.3 0
(4) Since the 1954 codification of the trade or business gross receipts
test would therefore be the exception to the general 25% omission rule,
the IRS argues this is proof that Congress in its 1954 codification
intended the general rule of the 25% omission rule to be broader in its
application. 305 That is, it would include: (i) omissions of receipts and
accruals of sales of products or services in the course of a trade or
business; and (ii) omissions of other types of gross income as defined
under § 61, such as gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets as
defined under § 1001(a).306 The IRS asserts further that finding Colony
to apply to the broader full definition, instead of limiting its application,
constitutes an omission from gross income, rendering the 1954 addition
of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) superfluous.
(5) Hence, the IRS asserts that in calculation of gains from the sale of
investments, such as the sale of S Corporation stock in Beard, basis
overstatement which leads to the understatement of the § 1001(a) gain
would not be controlled by the definition of gross income under the
trade or business gross receipts test. Accordingly, the special rule of that
test - that only omissions of gross receipts or accruals of income are
measured omissions - would not apply. Instead, the understatement of
the gain from the sale of investment property, due to a basis
overstatement, would rightfully be included as an omission. 307
In reaching its conclusion, the Tax Court in Beard leaned heavily on
the rationale of the June 2009 Ninth Circuit ruling in Bakersfield I1.308
The facts of Bakersfield II present another IRS argument that the
taxpayer pursued a sham transaction to create inflated basis, which

304. See Beard, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 185, at *10.

305. Id. at *6, *9-10; see also CC & FW Operations Ltd. v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 402,
406 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001).
306. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (LexisNexis 2000) (defining a gain from a sale or disposition to
be calculated as the amount realized less the basis). In a case such as Beard, the
overstatement of basis in the S Corporation stock would create an understatement of the
net gain under I.R.C. § 1001(a).
307. Beard, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 185, at *6; see also CC & FW Operations, 273
F.3d at 406 (expressing skepticism that Colony's holding should be applied to interpret
the "sales of goods and services" as a rule ignoring basis overstatements as omissions of
gross income). But see Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362, 1372-73 (Fed
Cir. 2009).
308. Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r (Bakersfield II), 568 F.3d 767, 77176 (9th Cir. 2009).
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substantially reduced a reported capital gain. The taxpayer's first line of
defense was a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the case due to
the tax deficiency assessment occurring after the expiration of the threeyear statute of limitations.309 The IRS defended, arguing the applicability
of § 6501(e) to extend the limitations period from three to six years due
to an alleged substantial omission of income. 1 o
The IRS similarly argued the third interpretative premise discussed
above.31 The Ninth Circuit rejected the IRS's argument to interpret
Colony as applying to the trade or business gross receipts test as an
exception to a broader definition of gross income.3 " The identical
verbiage of § 275(c), as interpreted in Colony, appeared word for word
Judicial
identically in the 1954 codification of § 6501(e)(1)(A).
new
that
precedent for statutory interpretation convinced the court
statutes should be interpreted identically to the meaning attributed to

309. Id.at 770.
310. Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r (Bakersfield 1), 128 T.C. 207, 208-10
(2007), affd, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009). Four partners of Bakersfield Energy Partners
("BEP"), a limited partnership, owning oil and gas property, failed to successfully
complete a sale of the properties to an unrelated party and then decided to restructure
the partnership. 128 T.C. at 208. They formed a new entity, Bakersfield Resources, LLC
("BRLLC"), through the sale by four partners of their 76.3% ownership to BRLLC on
April 1, 1988 for 19.9 million ( the gain from which was reported by the partners under
the installment method). Id. With this sale of more than 50 percent of BEP in a twelve
month period, I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B) was triggered, through which there was a technical
termination of the partnership for tax purposes. Id. at 209. This created a deemed
formation, for tax purposes, of a new partnership, to which BEP was deemed to
contribute all assets tax free under I.R.C. § 721, followed by the deemed termination of
the "old" BEP through distribution to its partners of proportionate shares of interests in
the "new" BEP (this was not a "legal" termination, but merely a "tax" termination). Id. at
209-10. The new BEP retained its employer identification number, but now consisted of
a new partnership, of which BRLLC was a 76.3% owner, with the remaining partners of
the "old" BEP owning their proportionate share of the "old" BEP. 568 F.3d at 769.
Because BEP had elected under I.R.C. § 754, BRLLC was permitted to allocate its outside
basis in the "new" BEP of $19.9 million to its assets under 1.R.C. § 743(b). Id. This
resulted in allocations of an additional $16.515 million to the zero bases of the oil and
gas properties. Id. When the oil and gas properties were sold to an unrelated party in
1998 for $23.898 million, the gain reported was $7.38 million, instead of $23.898
million. Id. Although not clear from the opinions, since the partners did individually
continue to report their installment sale gains on sales to BRLLC, the tax benefits of this
transaction appear derived through deferred reporting on at least 69 percent of the
proceeds, allowing for other possible planning for gain offsets in later years.
311. Bakersfield II, 568 F.3d at 775.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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identical language from a predecessor statute.3 " Hence, Colony's
interpretation of § 275(c) must be applied to § 6501(e)(1)(A), according
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit demonstrated
to the Ninth Circuit.1
some creative speculation as to the legislative intent of the congressional
motivations for this addition. Specifically, the addition of the trade or
business gross receipts test in § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) was considered a
clarification of what Congress apparently believed to be disputed
interpretations.31 1
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the convention that following
Colony's interpretation of the considerations for assessing what is an
omission of gross income would render the addition of §
6501(e)(1)(A)(i) superfluous in quite creative logic.317 The court
determined that Colony solely interprets what constitutes an "omission
of gross income" under the then language of § 275(c), which is exactly
analogous to § 6501(e)(1)(A), in calculating whether there has been a
In its opinion, the Colony court
greater than 25 percent omission.
only interprets how to calculate what amount of income is "omitted"
from gross income. Specifically, Colony rejects the traditional gross
income definition found in § 61 in which gains from property are
classified as gross income under the § 1001(a) definition of amount
realized less basis solely for purposes of calculating what is an omission
from gross income.31 ' The Ninth Circuit accordingly interpreted Colony
as maintaining the definition of "gross income" actually reported on the
return under the traditional gross income definition. The Ninth Circuit
rushes to the grand interpretation that only with the 1954 codified
addition of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) did we gain consistency in the definitions
of gross income as omitted as it is compared to total gross income
reported on the return.320 Therefore, magically, § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) is not
rendered superfluous as asserted by the IRS.
Just to be clear, consider this illustration: a tax return reports
$300,000 of wage income and a gain from the sale of stock of $80,000;
the gain is calculated as a gross sales price of $180,000, reduced by basis
of $100,000 for an $80,000 gain; the omission of gross income is
$100,000. Under Colony's sole interpretation, without considering any

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. at 775-76.
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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statutory additions in the 1954 codification, the application of § 275(c)
would produce $100,000, divided by gross income determined under the
traditional § 61 concepts. Accordingly, $300,000 of wages and the net
gain from the sale of stock of $80,000 would create $380,000 of gross
income reported on the return. Applying the 25% omission rule, the
amount of gross income omitted would be $100,000, divided by
$380,000, for a 26.3% omission of gross income. Since this exceeds the
25% threshold, the taxpayer would be subject to a six-year extended
statute of limitations. But, lo & behold, with the magic of the addition
of the trade or business receipts test to the 1954 codification of §
6501(e)(1)(A)(i), a different result occurs. Here, the definition of gross
income found in § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) defines gross income in the 25%
omission rule of § 6501(e)(1)(A) to apply to the amount of the omission
as well as the amount of gross income reported on the return.3 2 That is,
now the $300,000 of wage income would be increased by the gross
receipts received or accrued from the sale of products or services in a
trade or business. Forget for now that the Ninth Circuit did not take the
time to consider whether the sale of stock was the sale of a product or
service in this magic proposition. Simply increase $300,000 by the gross
receipts from the sale of $180,000 without any reduction for the cost of
the stock of $80,000. The result is the division of the $100,000 omission
of other income divided by $480,000 for a 20.8% omission, well under
the 25% of income reported threshold. Obviously these different
positions do produce different results.m This Author has not seen
321. Id.
322. Hoffman v. Comm'r, No. 16028-99L, 2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 44, at *17-22
(Sept. 24, 2002). Hoffman offers interesting precedential authority for Bakersfield's
analysis of the varied definitions of "gross income" in I.R.C. § 6501. Hoffman involves a
taxpayer (trying to do the right thing) who amended a return outside the three year
statute period to report omitted cancellation of indebtedness income and promptly paid
the additional tax. Id. at *5-6. As to be expected, the IRS assessed interest and
penalties. Id. at *6. Once the notice of intent to levy appeared, at a hearing on the
matter, the taxpayer essentially said, I made a mistake in amending the return, since it
was filed outside the three year statute of limitation . . . give me my money back! Id. at
*6-7. Of course, the IRS said no and this case is what resulted. Id. at *7-9. Hoffman
also gave the Tax Court an opportunity to point out in 2002 that the Supreme Court's
rationale in Colony, which solely applied to the definition of an omission of gross
income, had been expanded in the 1954 codification of I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i). Id. at
*17-18. Specifically, they interpreted the definition of gross income in the trade or
business gross receipts test to apply to determine not only the amount of gross income
omitted, but also to determine the amount of gross income shown on the return as well.
Id. The impact here was that the partnership flow through income on the taxpayer's
return required increasing by any possible reduction of gross receipts that might have
occurred by the cost of sales of products or services. Id. at *18-19. However, the IRS
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evidence in Bakersfield II that this was truly the intent of the drafters of
the 1954 codification. One might also argue at this juncture that in light
of the very different tax planning world that exists in today's
sophisticated tax world, Congress might want to reconsider what the
right interpretation should be and make it so!
In Bakersfield 11, the Ninth Circuit also revisits the considerations
addressed in Colony through which the Supreme Court emphasized the
critical choice of words that § 275(c) (currently § 6501(e)) used when
considering whether the taxpayer "omits from gross income an amount
properly includible therein which is in excess of 25% of the amount of
gross income stated in the return." The Circuit again emphasizes the
Colony statements recognizing prior taxpayer's arguments that "the
[clommissioner's reading fails to take full account of the word 'omits'
which Congress selected when it could have chosen another verb such
as 'reduces' or 'understates,' either of which would have significantly
supported the IRS position."02 ' Finally, the Ninth Circuit in Bakersfield
II did not find any specific limiting language in Colony that might imply
it was limited to factual patterns where the taxpayer was actually
engaged in a trade or business. Since Beard involved investment
transactions outside the context of a trade or business, this IRS
argument, if successful, could have saved their position. Alas, it did not.
Accordingly, the three-year statute was found to apply in Bakersfield
I.324 The taxpayer's motion for summary judgment was granted, finding
that the notice of deficiency sent by the IRS was not timely submitted
since it was not issued within the three-year statute of limitations
period.325
Bakersfield II represents just one more huge loss to the IRS in the
inflated basis cases, which have plagued them in this first decade of the
new millennium. Unfortunately, it is not even a loss after a significant
debate, not on the technical merits of the transaction, but instead a loss
on the procedural issues to simply "get up to bat." In the next subsection discussing developments in this area, another such loss is
delivered in the Federal Circuit appellate path.
Before moving to consider the Federal Circuit developments, the
practitioner should consider briefly a similar inflated basis case which

had not supplied that evidentiary information. Id. at *20-22. Thus, the application of
the six-year extended statute could not be proven and the taxpayer won! Id. The
numerical illustration above is adapted broadly from the example in this case.
323. Bakersfield II, 568 F.3d at 773.
324. Id. at 778.
325. Id.
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moved through the Tax Court recently, UTAM, Ltd. 326 This case was
decided under the same rational as Beard, with a heavy emphasis on the
precedential authority of Bakersfield 11. The case involves an alleged
inflated basis transaction created with a transactional structure involving
the combined use of an S Corporation and a limited partnership
interest.32 ' David Morgan, the primary owner of the entities, merged a
successful life insurance business into his wholly owned S Corporation
UTA Management.328 Shortly thereafter, attempting to avoid the Texas
franchise tax, the business assets of UTA Management were transferred
into a newly created limited partnership UTAM, Ltd. in exchange for a
partnership interest.329 UTAM, Ltd. was then owned primarily by UTA
Management with the remaining 1.24% owned by DDM Management
Inc., another S Corporation owned by Mr. Morgan and other family
members.330 Shortly after the formation of UTAM, Ltd., an offer to buy
the insurance business assets was received from an unrelated third
Prior to the culmination of this sale, UTA Management entered
party.
into a short sale of borrowed United States treasury notes for $38
million. 33 2 The cash from the sale and its related short sale obligation
was transferred to UTAM, Ltd.33 3 As in Beard and Salman Ranch III,3
the cash was considered an asset contributed to UTAM, Ltd. thereby
increasing UTA Management's basis in UTAM, Ltd. by $38 million.
However, the taxpayer asserted the position that the related short sale
obligation assumed by UTAM, Ltd. was not considered a Treas. Reg. §
752 liability as it was deemed undeterminable due to the uncertainty of
the cost of replacement treasury notes. 3 The partnership interest was
326. UTAM, Ltd. v. Comm'r, No. 24762-06, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258 (Nov. 9,
2009). Respondents motion for the court to reconsider was denied on May 19, 2010,
triggering the ninety-day period in which an appeal can be filed. Id. at * 10. The status
of the appeal was unknown at time of this Article's submission.
327. Id. at *2-3.
328. Id. at *2.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. UTAM, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258, at *2-3.
332. Id. at *3.
333. Id.
334. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch III), 573 F.3d 1362, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
335. I.R.C. § 723 (2000).
336. The 1999 transaction preceded the issuance of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7 (2003).
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7 replaced Temp. Reg. § 1T.752-6 (effective regarding partnership
liabilities for transactions between October 18, 1999 and June 24, 2003). Under
transactions affected by Temp. Reg. § 1T.752-6, the actual amount required to close the
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sold shortly thereafter with the reported gain challenged."' The IRS
challenged the transaction as a sham transaction, lacking economic
substance, designed solely to inflate the basis in light of the likelihood
that the short sale positions were primarily risk-less due to the nature of
treasury notes."' Therefore, the IRS asserted a deficiency attributable to
the alleged gain understatement of $41.1 million basis for UTAM, Ltd.'s
failure to reduce the outside basis of the partnership after its increase
from the contributed $38 million for the related short sale obligation
assumed by UTAM, Ltd. with the cash contribution. 39 Since the tax
assessment did not occur within the three-year statute, again, as in
Beard, the taxpayer sought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss
the assessment.3"' Again, the dismissal request was premised on the
argument that I.R.C. § 6501 did not apply to extend the statute of
limitations to six years and the assessment was therefore not timely.3
The taxpayer here, just as in Beard, was successful as the Tax Court
applied the precedent of the cases discussed above - Colony, Bakersfield
II, Salmon Ranch III, and Beard."'
C.

The United States Court of Appeals for the FederalCircuit Weighs in on
Debate Over I.R.C. § 6501 (e) (1) (A)

Salman Ranch III,3 a 2009 decision in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, was released shortly after the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Bakersfield II.3' The Federal Circuit reversed the
Court of Federal Claims decision in favor of the taxpayer, rejecting the
short sale was considered undeterminable until the assets, such as the United States
treasury notes in UTAM, were re-acquired to replace the sold borrowed assets. In UTAM,
the partner argued that the actual obligation was contingent, thereby avoiding the
reduction of the basis already increased by the cash contributed from the short sale of
$38 million. UTAM, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258, at *3-4. Nonetheless, this
"disregarded" liability was still paid by the partnership; yet the amount was not used to
reduce the contributing partner's basis. Id. The overstatement of the partner's outside
basis ultimately created the overstated basis at issue in UTAM. Id. at * 1.
337. Id. at *2-3.
338. Id. at *4.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958); Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v.
Comm'r (Bakersfield II), 568 F.3d 767 (2009); Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States
(Salman Ranch Ill), 573 F.3d 1362, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Beard v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M.
(CCH) 95 (2009).
343. Salman Ranch Ill, 573 F.3d at 1362.
344. Bakersfield II, 568 F.3d at 767.
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lower court's decision that I.R.C. § 6501 applied to extend the statute of
Salman Ranch started with the transfer in
limitations to six years?
1987 of a ranch by the owners into a partnership formed as Salman
Ranch Ltd. 6 On October 8, 1999, the partners of Salman Ranch Ltd., in
their individual capacities, entered into short sales of borrowed treasury
notes, generating $10.98 million in sales proceeds.347 Five days later,
these proceeds, with the short sale obligations requiring the repurchase
of replacement treasury notes, were contributed to Salman Ranch Ltd. by
Then, sometime between the transfer to the
the individual partners.
partnership, but before November 30, 1999, the partnership closed the
short sale transaction, acquiring the replacement treasury notes for
$10.981 million.
Now, let us consider the impact of these steps so far. Attendant to
the transfer of the proceeds from the sale of the borrowed treasury notes
was the related increase to each partner's outside basis in Salman Ranch
Ltd. under § 723m31 from the contribution each partner's proportionate
share of the $10.98 million sales proceeds. At this point in these
transactions, and prior to the promulgation of the son-of-BOSS
the impact of contingent liabilities on each partner's
regulations,
outside basis was somewhat unsettled. The partners apparently treated
345. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch 1), 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 190
(2007).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. I.R.C. § 723 (2000).
351. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7 (2003). The asserted position by many taxpayers in these
cases was that the related short sale obligation to acquire replacement investments to
cover the short sale was not properly a liability under I.R.C. § 752, which generally
required a basis reduction to a partner's outside basis when the partner transferred the
liability potential to the partnership. This question was resolved through Treas. Reg. §
1.752-7. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7. Under this regulation, where a contingent obligation
is transferred into the partnership, at the time of such transfer it still is not treated as a
liability, such that it reduces the transferor partner's outside basis at transfer. Id.
Instead, it is considered an I.R.C. § 704(c) built-in loss to the transferor partner. Id.
Therefore, when the contingent liability is actually paid by the partnership, it is treated
as a built-in loss allocable to the transferor partner at the value estimated at the time of
the transfer. Alternatively, if the transferor partner disposes of the partnership interest
before the liability is paid, such partner's outside basis must be reduced by the liability
amount that remains unsatisfied in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7(e)(1). See id.
§ 1.752-7(e)(1). However, these regulations were not in effect to be used in resolving
the substantive issues in these "inflated basis" cases and are beyond the scope of a full
discussion in this Article.
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the short sale obligations as contingent liabilities, arguing that the
impact of assuming contingent liabilities can be disregarded since the
amount of the liability that the partnership actually owed to acquire the
replacement treasury notes is supposedly "undeterminable." 35 2 Had the
liabilities assumed been determinable, such as a value of $10 million,
then the amount of the liabilities assumed by the partnership from the
partner's transfer would, without question, be treated as deemed cash
distributions to the partners under § 752. The impact would have been
a fairer reflection of the true net increase in worth from the contribution
to the partnership of the short sale proceeds with the attendant
obligation to replace the sold treasury notes. For example, had the
amount of the obligation to close the short sale been determined to be
$10 million, then it would reduce the $10.98 million in sales proceeds,
resulting in a total net increase in the partner's outside basis in Salman
Ranch Ltd. of $0.98 million. 5 Instead, in Salman Ranch the impact of
the contingent liability was not considered in determining the partner's
outside basis. Accordingly, there was an increase to the partner's outside
basis in the ranch of $10.98 million due to the cash proceeds
contributed, yet there was not any reduction in the partner's outside
basis for the liability the partnership assumed to close the short sale
obligation."'
This mechanism for calculating basis increased the
partner's basis in Salman Ranch Ltd. by $10.98 million. Yet as the facts
reveal, no less than five days after the transfer into the partnership, the
treasury notes were replaced for $10.981 million;5 5 obviously an
amount that was "determinable" in a mere five days.35 6
Now that the nature of the "inflated basis" in this case has been
revealed, let's review the end of the "hat trick" through which the
inflated basis is used to significantly reduce the gain from an obviously
pre-planned sale of Salman Ranch Ltd. As has been the case in these
352. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch 1), 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 192
(2007). So the theory goes, yet of course the IRS asserted that Treasury Notes are
virtually riskless from market fluctuations, so there is a question technically as to the
appropriateness of the position that these liabilities qualified as contingent. See id.
353. I.R.C. § 752(b).
354. Id. Liabilities transferred by a partner to a partnership are considered a deemed
distribution of money, thereby triggering a decrease in the partner's basis by the amount
of the liability transferred from the partner to the partnership. See id.
355. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch 1), 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 190
(2007).
356. The absence of economic substance in this "magic" basis calculation has been
widely attacked with varied facts under "Son-of-BOSS." So, you can understand IRS's
fervor to win these cases and the likely frustration when such attempts are thwarted
through operation of the three-year statute of limitations.
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"inflated basis" partnership transactions, on November 30, 1999, after
the basis of each partner's interest had allegedly been "inflated," each
partner then contributed his partnership interest in Salman Ranch Ltd.
to a newly created respective family partnership in exchange for an
interest in the family partnership.3 7
This transfer triggered a §
708(b)(1)(B) technical termination of Salman Ranch Ltd. due to the sale
or exchange in a twelve-month period of at least fifty percent of the total
interest in its capital and profits."'
With this fictional deemed
termination, the resulting "new" partnership is owned by each partner's
respective family partnerships. Accordingly, the assets of the former
Salman Ranch Ltd. were the assets of the "new" Salman Ranch Ltd.
However, the partners were now the family partnerships. On the final
return of the "terminated" partnership, an election was made under §
754 for a § 743(b)(1) basis adjustment. 3" The § 743(b)(1) basis
adjustment is the mechanism through which a partner's outside basis,
when different from the inside basis of the partnership property's basis,
is adjusted to allocate the difference proportionately to the inside basis
of the partnership's assets.'
In Salman Ranch III, the inflated basis
generated from the contribution to Salman Ranch Ltd. of the proceeds
from the partner's sale of the treasury note with the related short sale
obligation created a high outside partner basis as compared to the inside
basis of partnership assets. Accordingly, under the § 754 election for a §
743(b)(1) basis adjustment, the difference in basis was allocated
proportionately among the partnership assets, thereby increasing the
inside basis of the assets.36 ' The step-up in basis created an additional
$6.85 million of basis allocated to all of the partnership property.
Following the transfer and related step-up in basis of the
partnership's underlying property, only one month later, at the end of
the tax year 1999, the partnership sold part of the ranch for $7.088
million with an option to sell the remaining portion for $100,000 and

357. Salman Ranch 1,79 Fed. Cl. at 191.
358. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman III), 573 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2009). The family partnerships were newly created to provide an entity through which
there could be a transfer of the "inflated basis" partnership interests. Id. at 1378. Such a
transfer was needed to trigger the technical termination. See discussion supra note 170
(reviewing the technical termination). Remember this is not a legal termination, but a
termination solely for tax purposes under the fiction created in Subchapter K.
359. Salman Ranch 1,79 Fed. Cl. at 191.
360. See I.R.C. § 743(b)(1) (2000).
361. Salman Ranch III, 573 F.3d at 1364.
362. Id.
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$656.12 per acre. 6 The 1999 family partnership tax return reported the
sale of the ranch for $7.188 million reduced by the alleged "inflated"
basis of $6.85 million. 36 4 The resulting gain of approximately $338,000
was proportionately allocated to each of the WJS, DMS and FSK family
partnerships.365 Although the partners reported their proportionate
share of the gain from the ranch sale via flow-through from the
appropriate Schedule K-1 reporting, their individual returns reported a
small capital loss from the short sale as dated in October 1999 when the
partners sold the borrowed treasury notes with the basis determined
from the partnership's acquisition of replacement notes. 366 There was no
disclosure that Salman Ranch Ltd. had assumed the short sale position,
nor that it was the entity that closed the position. Further, there was no
indication that the loss was a partnership transaction that would be
passed through on the Schedule K-1 to the individual partners.367
The IRS did not issue the final partnerships administrative
adjustment ("FPAA"), adjusting the capital gain on the 1999 partnership
tax return until 2006, well after the expiration of the three-year statute
of limitations."* It was their position on the FPAA that the "alleged"
inflated basis allocated to the sold assets was $4.6 million, thereby
increasing the capital gain by $4.6 million from the amount of gain
reported on the return.36 The IRS characterized the transaction as a
variant of the Son-of-BOSS tax shelter under 1.R. Notice 2000-44,370 and
the rationale for its assessment centered on the following as stated in the
FPAA:
Salman Ranch Ltd. was availed of for improper tax avoidance purposes
by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its
partners ... . The transactions involving short sales of Treasury Notes,
363. Id. at 1364-65.
364. Id. at 1365.
365. Id.
366. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch 1), 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 191
(2007).
367. Id.
368. Salman Ranch III, 573 F.3d at 1365.
369. Id.
370. IR Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255. Son-of-BOSS transactions have been
described by the Tax Court as a variety of the older Bond and Options Sales Strategy
("BOSS") tax shelter. As described, the common feature involves assets transferred to a
partnership which are "encumbered by significant liabilities." As the liabilities are not
fixed at transfer and might be deemed uncertain, they may in some circumstances be
ignored in calculating basis at the time of the transfer. The result is an increase to basis
for the high-value assets, without a corresponding reduction of basis for the uncertain
liability. See Kligfeld Holdings v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 192, 194 (2007).
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including the formation of Salman Ranch Ltd., the acquisition of short
positions in said Treasury Notes, the contribution of said Treasury Note
positions to Salman Ranch Ltd. and the assignment of partnership
interests to [the family limited partnerships] had no business purpose,
lacked economic substance, and, in fact and substance, constitutes an
economic sham for federal income tax purposes.'
In response to the FPAA, the taxpayers filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the assessment be held invalid since an extended
six-year statute of limitations under § 6501(e)(1)(A) was not applicable
to a basis overstatement.3 2 The Federal Court of Claims decision in
Salmon Ranch 373 held in favor of the IRS that the six-year statute of
limitations would be applicable in these facts. 3 " The taxpayer then
petitioned for and was granted certification for an interlocutory appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.37 ' The
appeal was based solely on the issue of whether the extended six-year
statute of limitations was properly applied by the Federal Court of
Claims, and the request to review such an interlocutory order was
granted by the Federal Circuit."' These facts set the stage for the
Federal Circuit to decide the same interpretative issue regarding the
application of the extended statute under § 6501(e)(1)(A), which had
been previously addressed in conflicting rulings in the Tax Court and
federal district court.
Salman Ranch I did not follow the broader interpretations of Colony
that require a specific omission of gross receipts for there to be deemed
an "omission" of 25% of gross income. Specifically, the Federal Court of
Claims appeared most swayed by the IRS's arguments that Colony was to
be construed to define omissions of gross income as an omission of gross
371. Salman Ranch III, 573 F.3d at 1365.
372. Id. at 1367.
373. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch 1), 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 204
(2007).
374. Id.

375. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch II), 89 Fed. Cl. 653, 657
(2007)
376. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch IV), No. 866273, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8505, at *4 (Mar. 11, 2008).
377. See Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm'r (Bakersfield 1), 128 T.C. 207, 214-15
(2007) (declining to apply the six-year limitations period under I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)
to gains which are understated due to an overstatement of the basis). But see Brandon
Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 806-CV-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
54922, at *36 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007) (declining to apply the six-year limitations
period under I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) to gains which are understated by the fact that basis
is overstated in Son-of-BOSS facts).
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receipts that were "left out" solely in inventory transactions involving a
Salman Ranch I referred
trade or business selling goods or services.
several times to the Colony facts, which specifically involved the sale of
inventory lots as a trade or business."' Nonetheless, the court did
consider a review of the conflicting decisions for this interpretation,8
after which the court appeared aligned with the Florida federal district
court opinion in Brandon Ridge Partnersv. United States," in which this
same definition of an omission of gross income was applied to extend
the limitations period in facts presenting a similar basis overstatement in
Salman Ranch I rejected the findings of
a Son-of-BOSS transaction. 8
Grapevine Imports, Ltd, which interpreted § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) to require
an omission of gross receipts from the sale of products and services in a
trade or business from both inventory sales, as well as other sales
involving basis adjustments for reporting gains, such as capital gains.8
Salman Ranch Is rejection seemed grounded in judicial precedent
requiring the statute to be read in its entirety, to avoid any of its
language to be considered superfluous. Accordingly, Salman Ranch I
stated:
[Slection 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) provides an exception to the customary

definition of gross income in the event of sales of goods or services by a
trade or business, allowing that "gross income," as used in section
6501(e)(1)(A), will be defined as the 'gross receipts' alone of those sales.
Under I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A), in order for an omission from gross
income to arise in the context of sales of goods or services by a trade or
business (which under the 1.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) gross receipts
provision actually should read "omits from gross 'receipts"'), an omission
of a receipt must occur. The Colony Court's declaration that section

275(c) is "limited to situations in which specific receipts or accruals of
income items are left out of the computation of gross income" makes
eminent sense because The Colony, Inc. was a trade or business selling
goods or services. The Court's conclusion that The Colony, Inc. had not

omitted any gross income and thus was not liable under section 275(c)
378. Salman Ranch 1, 79 Fed. Cl. at 201.
379. Id.
380. Bakersfield 1, 128 T.C. at 215; Grapevine Imports, Ltd v. United States, 77 Fed.
Cl. 505, 511 (2007) (holding, under its interpretation of Colony, that the six-year
limitation period under I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) does not apply to an overstatement of
basis which creates an understatement of a net gain from the sale of property).
381. Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4922 (M.D. Fla.
July 30, 2007).
382. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch 1), 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 198
(2007).
383. Grapevine Imports, 77 Fed. Cl. at 509-10.
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is "in harmony with the unambiguous language of § 6501(e)(1)(A)," in
that the resolution would be the same under either provision.
[Salman Ranch Ltd.'s] contention that a taxpayer never may be liable for
an omission from gross income due to an overstatement of basis is an
impermissibly broad rendering of the Colony holding. It is more accurate
to say that Colony held that section 275(c) - in harmony with the
unambiguous language of I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) - only imposes liability
on a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business selling goods or services
where the taxpayer "omitted some income receipt or accrual in his
computation of gross income." Thus, Colony does not speak generally, as
[Salman Ranch Ltd.] urge[s], to the meaning of the word "omit," and the
Supreme Court did not set forth a general prescription for every instance
in which an omission of income may be contested. 8
Of course, Salman Ranch I was appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals Federal Circuit, which disagreed with the Court of Federal
Claims' limitation of the scope of Colony. The appellate court supported
the taxpayer's assertion that Colony did not emphasize the type of sale of
property that included a basis overstatement, but rather emphasized the
Accordingly, the court interpreted
definition of the term "omits."8
Colony to stand for the premise that an omission of gross income
requires an omission of gross receipts, thus limiting the applicability of
the six-year extended statute. This interpretation by the Federal Circuit
First, the court
was premised on two familiar interpretations.
emphasized that the language interpreted in Colony ("omits from gross
income an amount properly includible therein") is identical to the
successor § 6501(e)(1)(A) language discussed in Colony."' Second, the
Supreme Court decision references that the Colony application was "in
harmony with the unambiguous language of § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954."" In combination, it appears that the
Federal Circuit considered these two interpretations to indicate that the
Supreme Court considered the revised statute as codified in 1954 and
considered its decision to be in harmony with the unambiguous
language of the "trade or business of selling goods and service" exception
of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."'
Therefore, the Federal Circuit was not prepared to limit the statutory

384. Salman Ranch 1, 79 Fed. Cl. at 199-200 (internal citations omitted).
385. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman III), 573 F.3d 1362, 1370-77 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
386. Id. at 1370.
387. Id. at 1369.
388. Id. at 1373.
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interpretation of "omissions of gross income" in Colony only to
businesses selling goods or service in a trade or business as inventory.
The court did, however, recognize that the Supreme Court did not
appear to interpret § 6501(e)(1)(A) in the Colony decision. 3 89 However,
the Federal Circuit did extend the Colony interpretation to §
Its decision considered that the absence of
6501(e)(1)(A).39 0
congressional action to overrule the judicial interpretation of the
limiting interpretations of Colony may be construed as an expression of
In light of this, one
intent to accept the judicial interpretations. 9
which seem
transactions,
basis
of
inflated
era
this
in
that
should suggest
a
far beyond the intent of Subchapter K, we should begin mass letter
campaign to our local senators and congressmen to reconsider
acceptance of this interpretation by default. The result of all this
precedential authority in the Federal Court of Claims, as well as in the
Tax Court, and now the Ninth Circuit, can lead to an inability to quickly
prosecute enough to re-claim tax dollars contributing to the growing tax
gap. The question remaining, as we consider this for the North Carolina
practitioner, is whether the Fourth Circuit will follow the precedential
considerations of the Federal Circuit, the Tax Court, or the Ninth
Circuit. The following cases offer some guidance, although limited.
D. Interpretationof I.R.C. § 6501 (e) (1) (A)'s Extension of the Three-Year
Statute of Limitations to Six Years with Tax Basis Understatement in
Cases Appealable to the Fourth Circuit
As we look to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit for the Carolinas, Virginia, and Maryland, we will see that it has
not had an opportunity to interpret what qualifies as an omission of
gross income under 1.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A), despite the litigation of two
such cases in district courts within its geographic region. The first case,
from the Eastern District of North Carolina, Home Concrete & Supply,
LLC v. United States, rejected the Tax Court position asserted by the
taxpayer in interpreting § 6501(e)(1)(A) and upheld the IRS's assertion
Unfortunately, there will not be an
of an extended six-year statute.
opportunity to determine whether the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit would take a different position from the Tax Court,
the Ninth Circuit and the Federal Circuit, since the parties settled after
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. (citing BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-02 (1983)).
392. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC (HCS I) v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678,
687 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
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the IRS won the first scrimmage. The second case, Highwood Partnersv.
Commissioner, originates with a Virginia partnership in Tax Court with
yet a different type of an "inflated basis" transaction challenged by the
IRS as a sham transaction 3 Highwood Partners presents a shift in the
Tax Court's positions due to the nature of the underlying transaction. In
this decision, the Tax Court departs from its prior restrictive
interpretation of § 6501(e)(1)(A)'s six-year extended limitations period
through rejecting the applicability of the Colony rationale in these
unique facts.3 4 This case is discussed for the practitioner's awareness
that regulatory compliance reporting requirements can be quite
important in determining whether a transaction might be classified as an
"omission" of gross income. It is important to note in the Virginia case
that the foreign currency transaction had unique disclosure
requirements regulated under § 988, which led to a different
interpretation of what constitutes an "omission" of gross income under §
6501.395
1. Success for the IRS in the Eastern District of North Carolinain
Extending the Three-Year Statute of Limitations to Six Years ...
Too Bad the Taxpayer Settled after this Decision, Leaving Us
Without a Clear Picture of How the Fourth CircuitMight Rule
In HCS I, taxpayers Robert and Susanne D. Pierce and Stephen R.
and Rebecca R. Chandler on April 15, 1999 formed three Limited
Liability Companies (Home Concrete & Supply, LLC ("Home
Concrete"), Salisbury Investments LLC... ("Salisbury"), and Goodnight
Investments, LLC. ("Goodnight")).397 Home Concrete was entitled to
partnership treatment as a pass-through entity with its owners deemed
partners for purposes of federal tax reporting.398 The other crucial
related entity in this case is Home Oil & Coal Company, Inc. ("Home

393. Highwood Partners v. Comm'r, No. 24463-06, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 19, at
*14 (Aug. 13, 2009).
394. Id. at *12.
395. Id. at *12-13.
396. HCS 1, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 682 n.7 (noting that Pierce & Goodnight Investments,
LLC (owned by Chandler) owned Salisbury Investments, LLC).
397. ICS 1, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 678; Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. Comm'r (HCS
II), No. 7:06-CV-181-FL, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127250, at *14 (Mar. 9, 2009)
(addressing the standard to qualify for adequate disclosure, which exempts an omission
from gross income from triggering the six year extended limitations period under I.R.C.
§ 6501(e)(1)(A)).
398. HCS 1,599 F. Supp. 2d at 680 n.1.
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Oil") owned by Mr. Pierce and Mr. Chandler."' In review of HCS I, the
focus of this case, as with the others discussed in Section III, begins with
a plan involving the use of a short sale of United States treasury notes in
combination with a transfer of the sales proceeds of the short sale with
the obligation to close the short sale to a related entity."
Approximately twenty-eight days later, the taxpayers, through their
respective investment LLCs and several other family trusts, implemented
a transaction in which they sold borrowed United States treasury notes
in the open market subject to an obligation to replace the borrowed
The short sale
securities with the lending brokerage house."
transaction is a common investment tool strategy used to sell borrowed
securities at a high fair market value to be followed by a repurchase of
identical securities hopefully at a lower fair market value for replacing
the borrowed securities.40 2 Obviously, the obligation in a speculative
investment market with certain securities can make this a risky venture.
However, the risk associated with the United States treasury notes is
nominal. No one can know the exact liability for the replacement
securities; thus, the argument that the liability to replace the borrowed
notes is a "contingent" liability. As discussed in the earlier cases in
Section III, this is a crucial aspect to the transaction since it impacts the
basis calculation when the liability to replace the treasury notes is
assumed by the partnership."
In HCS I, four days later on May 17,
1999, the taxpayers transferred the proceeds from the short sale, with
the obligation to close the short sale by repurchase, to the newly formed
399. Id. at 680.
400. Id. at 681, 682 n.7. The Treasury note short sales were initiated by Salisbury
Investments, LLC, Goodnight Investments, LLC, and trusts owned by the Pierces and
Chandler. Id. at 682 n.7. The tax planning in HCS I was devised by Arthur Andersen
LLP, in conjunction with the law firm of Jenkins & Gilchrist. Id. at 681. Arthur
Andersen, LLP is no longer a viable firm despite the unanimous Supreme Court verdict
overturning a 2002 conviction for obstruction of justice. See Arthur Andersen LLP v.
United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). Similarly, Jenkens & Gilchrist is now dissolved due
to class settlements, penalties and overall bad publicity driving partners and clients away
in droves from tax strategies found lacking in economic substance. Katie Fairbank &
Terry Maxon, How Jenkens & Gilchrist Lost Its Way, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 1,
2007,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/040107dnentjenkens.3e099d
1.html.
401. Id. at 682n.7.
402. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back, Anatomy of a
Tax Shelter, 62 TAX LAWYER 59, 79 n.88 (2008).
403. See Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch 111), 573 F.3d 1362, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing the impact of contingent liabilities contributed to
partnership on a partner's outside basis).
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Home Concrete LLC.1* At this point, the cash contribution increased
the contributing partner's basis in Home Concrete, yet with the
obligation to close the short sale position asserted as an indeterminable
contingent liability, their outside basis in the partnership was not
reduced by its assumption of this liability to replace the borrowed
treasury notes." On the very next day, the Home Concrete partners,
using the contributed proceeds, acquired the replacement securities and
closed the short sale obligation." The end result: the Home Concrete
partners' outside basis is greatly increased due to the contribution of the
cash proceeds from the initial short sale on May 17, 1999, without any
reduction for the short sale obligation satisfied by the partnership.0 7
This "strategy" to "inflate" the basis of the partners' interests in
Home Concrete, LLC was designed in anticipation of the sale of Home
After increasing the partners' outside basis in Home
Oil, Inc."
Concrete, LLC, within the next thirty days, substantially all of the
business assets of Home Oil, Inc. were transferred to Home Concrete as a
capital contribution.409 Twenty-four days later, Pierce and Chandler
transferred their member/partnership interests in Home Concrete, LLC
(with the related "inflated" outside basis) to Home Oil, Inc. as capital
contributions."o At this point, Home Oil, Inc. became a holding
company controlling Home Concrete, LLC, which now held the lowbasis business assets formerly owned by Home Oil, Inc.4 1 ' This set the
stage for the partner, Home Oil Inc., with a high outside basis in its
partnership interests in Home Concrete, LLC to operate under an I.R.C.
§ 754 election to equalize its outside basis in partnership interests in
Home Concrete, LLC proportionately to increase the lower inside basis
of Home Concrete, LLC's business assets. 412 The result was to increase
404. HCS 1,599 F. Supp. 2d at 682 n.7.
405. I.R.C. § 752 (2000). Under I.R.C. § 752, a known liability assumed by the
partnership would be deemed a cash distribution to a transferor/partner, thereby
reducing the partner's outside basis in the partnership. See id.
406. HCS 1,599 F. Supp. 2d at 682 n.7.
407. Id.
408. See supra note 196. Home Oil, Inc. was controlled by Pierce and Chandler. HCS
1, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
409. HCS 1, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 682 n.7. Remember, Home Concrete is deemed a
partnership for federal income tax purposes, so Home Oil, Inc. obtains a partnership
interest in exchange for the transfer of assets.
410. Id. I.R.C. § 362(a)(2) assigns a carryover basis to property that a corporation
receives as a capital contribution, with increases for any gain recognized on the transfer
by the transferor. See I.R.C. § 362(a)(2).
411. HCS I, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 682 n.7.
412. Id. at 682.
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basis of the business assets of Home Concrete, LLC from $4.5 million to
$10.5 million.4 1 3 With the subsequent sale of substantially all of Home
Concrete, LLC's assets for $10.6 million a couple of months thereafter,
obviously the strategy, gone unchallenged, would have significantly
reduced the taxpayer's gain on the sale of its business. 1 4
Foiling this capital gain reduction strategy, the IRS challenged the
increased basis under prior arguments, alleging it was a "sham"
transaction through an FPAA assessment in September 2006."' The
taxpayer paid the deficiency and sued under a claim for refund of
approximately $1.4 million in the Eastern District Court of North
Carolina.41 6 The taxpayer immediately requested a summary judgment,
asserting that the IRS assessment was barred by the expiration of the
three-year statute of limitations.'
Consistent with its previous
arguments, the IRS argued that I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) provided an
extended six-year limitation period due to a significant omission of gross
income exceeding the required twenty-five percent omission
threshold.'
Again, the IRS contended that the omission of gross
income occurred through an overstatement of Home Oil, Inc.'s basis in
Home Concrete, LLC, originating in the manipulation of the basis
calculation and the assumed "contingent" liability to replace the sold
treasury notes.419 Allegedly, this basis overstatement ultimately led to an
overstatement in the basis used to calculate gain on the 1999 sale of
Home Concrete, LLC's business assets, hence, the statute should be
extended.4 20
The district court reviewed all of the existing arguments regarding
the applicability of the Supreme Court's decision in Colony as reviewed
in the previous cases discussed herein. Yet, it appeared to emphasize the
rationale of Salman Ranch 1421 (prior to its reversal by the Ninth Circuit
in Salman Ranch II).42

It also appeared to give significant weight to the

statutory definitions of "gross income" asserted by the IRS. Specifically
that gross income is broadly construed as "all income from whatever
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 680.

417. Id.

418. Id.
419. Id. at 682.
420. Id. at 683.
421. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch 1), 79 Fed. Cl. 189 (2007).
422. Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States (Salman Ranch III), 573 F.3d 1362, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
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gains derived from dealings in

property," with gains derived from dealings in property defined in §
1001(a) as "the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the
adjusted basis."424
The court concluded that this basis overstatement did produce an
omission of the gain derived from dealings in property that constituted
an omission from gross income of an amount properly included therein
under § 6501(e)(1)(A).425 Accordingly, the court denied the taxpayer's
motion for summary judgment, in part applying the six-year statute of
limitation asserted by the IRS.4 6 The court held the final decision in
abeyance pending additional review of the substantive question of
whether the omission which exceeds 25% percent of the gross income
originally reported was adequately disclosed such that the IRS would
have been apprised of the "nature and amount" of the omission as
required under the safe harbor exception of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii).42 If
such disclosure was found to have been made, the six-year extended
limitations period would not apply, despite the sufficiency of the
omission of gross income.42
The issues held in abeyance were resolved in HCS II, when a final
In this decision, the court
decision was rendered in March 2009.2
addressed whether the taxpayer could assert the safe harbor exception
under § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) due to adequate disclosure of the nature and
amount of the item leading to the understatement of gross income. The
court scrutinizes the sufficiency of the taxpayer's disclosures of the
transactions leading to the basis increase as follows:
(1) First, the taxpayers assert that Pierce and Chandler's individual tax
returns disclosed the short sale and referred to the fact that the
obligation to close it was outstanding. The district court found nothing
in this disclosure to "reasonably indicate[ that the opening of the short
sales was related to the basis step-up of Home Concrete."43 o Instead, the
court felt that this disclosure "mask[ed] the ultimate purpose of those
short sales."4 31
423. HCS 1, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1999)).
424. Id. at 687.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. Comm'r (HCS II), No. 7:06-CV-181-FL, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127250 (Mar. 9, 2009).
430. Id. at *14.
431. Id.
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(2) Home Concrete's 1999 Form 1065 (United States partnership
income tax return) disclosed the sale of the treasury bonds on Schedule
D. However, the court found the labeling of this sale to be misleading
with a sales price listed dated May 19, 1999 and a basis listed with a date
of acquisition of May 18, 1999, giving the appearance that the net gain of
$113,362 had been earned in one day, without any indication that it was
a gain derived from the closing of a short sale.
Implicit in the court's analysis of the return disclosures was the
determination that these two items do not provide an indication of the
essence of the transaction in question - that is, that they are connected as
an opening of a short sale on the individual tax returns ultimately closed
and reported on the Home Concrete return. 3 Interesting dicta from the
court indicates some link of the two transactions; even the words on the
Home Concrete, LLC return indicating that the gain was derived from
the closing of a short sale, may have been sufficient. 3 ' Finding no
adequate disclosure, the court ruled that the adequate disclosure
exception was not applied and the extension of the six-year statute was
sustained.3 Had the parties not settled the substantive issues after this
decision by joint stipulation entered on June 1, 2009, followed by a joint
motion for judgment on October 2, 2009, a subsequent appeal may have
offered practitioners the opportunity to assess the Fourth Circuit's
likelihood of following the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Federal
Circuit's consensus as to the precedential value of the Supreme Court's
decision in Colony.4 36
2.

Successful IRS Challenge to Extend Limitations Period in a Unique
Inflated Tax Basis Shelter Transactionwith Incorrect Compliance
Disclosures Due to Netting of a Foreign Currency Gain and Loss
Transactionfor Offsetting Long and Short Options

Highwood Partners involves foreign currency transactions as the
basis for an IRS assertion that Highwood Partners was a sham designed
solely in 1999 to artificially inflate the bases of stock contributed to the

432. Id. at*15-16.
433. Id. at *14-16.
434. Id. at *16 n.7 ("[H]ad plaintiffs correctly identified the short sale of Treasury
Bonds on Home Concrete's Schedule D, they may have had a strong claim to adequate
disclosure.").
435. Id. at *21.
436. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958).
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This case originated as part of an IRS "John Doe"
partnership.
summons on Jenkens & Gilchrist in 2003, by which the law firm was
forced to identify their clients who participated in "listed transactions.""s
The taxpayers were identified as a result of this summons in May
2004." Approximately two years later, in August 2006, the IRS issued a
Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment ("FPAA") assessment to
This Tax Court decision focuses primarily on the
Highwood Partners.'
IRS's ability to assert the extended six-year extension of the statute of
limitations under I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1) to this particular transaction and
does not delve into the merits of the taxpayer's tax treatment of these
transactions."'
Without analyzing the technical issues involved in the alleged sham
"artificial inflated bases" aspects of the foreign currency transactions at
issue in this case, some introduction of the transaction is warranted to
identify the income omission by Highwood Partners. The partners who
are the taxpayers/petitioners in this case, entered into foreign exchange
digital option transactions ("FXDOTs") through their disregarded LLC
entities." The FXDOTs involved an option spread on the United States
dollar/Japanese yen exchange rate." 3 Considering the long leg of the
FXDOT premium ($8.4 million), as offset by the short leg of the FXDOT
premium ($8.316 million), the partners through their LLCs were only
financially responsible to finance the net of the long and the short
premiums or $84,000."
Around this transaction, the partners contributed the FXDOT
options, cash, and their shares in Heilig-Meyers Co. ("HM Co.") and
437. Highwood Partners v. Comm'r, No. 24463-06, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 19 (Aug.
13, 2009). By order of Judge Joseph R. Goeke, the case was ultimately dismissed based
on a settlement agreement on the substantive issues in the case on February 23, 2010.
Transactions,
Listed
Tax
Transactions
438. IRS.gov,
EP
Abusive
http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/O,,id=119551,00.html (last visited June 30, 2010)
(defining a "listed transaction" as a "transaction that is the same as or substantially
similar to one that the IRS has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and
identified by IRS notice or other form of published guidance").
439. Highwood, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 19, at *4. The relevant taxpayers are
Michael and Karen Booth Adams, Richard and Mary Fowlkes, and the Booth and Adams
Irrevocable Family Trust. Id. The transaction included the use of single-member
disregarded LLCs to form Highwood Partners, with respected ownership by Mrs. Adams'
LLC of 47.62%, Mrs. Fowlkes' LLC of 29.76%, and the Trust's LLC of 22.62%. Id.
440. Id. at *7.
441. Id. at *2-3.
442. Id. at *3.
443. Id.
444. Id. at *6.
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Modis Professional Services, Inc. ("Modis") to Highwood Partners."
Upon this contribution of the FXDOT options, the partners' outside
bases in Highwood Partners were calculated considering only the
premiums paid by the taxpayers for the long leg of the options ($8.4
million) as an increase to their outside basis in Highwood Partners.45
Yet, these partners' outside bases were not reduced by the premiums
received by the taxpayers on the short leg of the option ($8.316 million),
which effectively reduced their combined net premium to $84,000. '
The FXDOTs were not exercised and expired while held by the
partnership."* Subsequently, the individual partners transferred their
partnership interests in Highwood Partners (as alleged to be inflated) to
a newly formed S Corporation, Highwood Investors, Inc, and their basis
in Highwood Partners carried over the outside basis in the partnership
interests to the S Corporation under the authority of I.R.C. § 362(a).44 9
Of course, as argued by the IRS, this carryover basis in Highwood
Partners, now owned by Highwood Investors, Inc., was overstated due to
a failure to consider the receipt of the premiums in the short leg of the
option as a reduction to the premiums paid for the options originally
contributed to Highwood Partners.co
Subsequently, at the end of 1999, the partners distributed the cash
and the Heilig-Meyers and Modis stock to Highwood Investors, Inc. (and
a related family trust also involved in the transactions).4' Therefore,
Highwood Investors, Inc.'s outside basis in the partnership interests of
Highwood Partners under the authority of § 732(b) was allocable to the
The assets distributed from Highwood Partners
distributed property.
were proportionately allocated the partner's (Highwood Investors, Inc.)
outside basis in the partnership.4 5 3 It is again, important to remember
that the basis of the Highwood Partners interest (now allocated to
distributed assets) in the hands of Highwood Investors, Inc. had been
determined in a manner that inflated the outside basis, which now was
445. Id. at *4.
446. I.R.C. § 723 (2000) ("The basis of property contributed to a partnership by a
partner shall be the adjusted basis of such property to the contributing partner at the
time of the contribution increased by the amount (if any) of gain recognized under
section 721(b) to the contributing partner at such time.").
447. Highwood, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 19, at *6.
448. Id. at *4.
449. Id.
450. Id. at *7.
451. Id. at *4.
452. Id. at *4-5.
453. Id. at *5.
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being allocated to assets distributed. This established the precedent facts
for an alleged understatement of the gain generated on December 30,
1999, when Highwood Investors, Inc. sold the Heilig-Meyers and Modis
stock to an unrelated party. These overstated losses were ultimately
applied as flow-through items to the Pierces and Chandler from
Highwood Investors, Inc. as a S Corporation.454 Alleging that Highwood
Partners was a sham transaction, lacking economic substance, through
which the related basis calculations were overstated, was the underlying
premise on which the IRS ultimately issued the 2006 FPAA
assessment.5
Crucial to the IRS's continuation of this litigation was its success in
arguing that under I.R.C. § 6501, the failure to report the FXDOT long
and short options transactions separately was an omission of gross
income sufficient to extend the limitations period to six years.5 6 Since
the long and short option legs were netted and not reported separately,
the IRS argued that Treas. Reg. § 1.988-1(e) specifically requires a
separate reporting of each I.R.C. § 988 transaction, even if they are
economically related.45 The Tax Court agreed that each short option
Since
was required to be separately stated from the long option.5
Highwood Partners reported a netting of the gain and loss from each,
they considered there to be an omission of $8.316 million in gross
income as reported.45 1 Considering all the prior arguments interpreting
Colony, as discussed herein, the IRS was successful in extending the
three-year limitations period to six years.46o The result was finally a win
for the IRS in Tax Court, in a long skirmish to simply get around the
three-year statute in an inflated basis case, opening a door of
opportunity to have the technical issues decided. The moral of the story
for practitioners relates to the clear understanding of the compliance
reporting requirements to assure an omission of gross income does not
occur in the tax compliance reporting process. Here, if the netting of the
transactions had been adequately disclosed in the return, attempts to
attack the transaction may have been moot under a three-year statute.
Alas, if the goal was to avoid detection of a questionable basis strategy,
adequate disclosure of omitted income obviously would thwart all plans.

454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Id. at *10.
Id. at *14-15.
Id. at *20-21.
Id. at *28-29.
Id. at *35-36.
Id.
Id. at *31-33.
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E. The Battle Moves to Interpretationof Temporary Regulations §
301.6501(e)-1T and § 301.6229(c) (2)-i T (Omissionfrom Return)
Following many disappointments in its efforts to assert extensions
of the statute of limitations in the inflated basis litigation, the IRS
proceeded with a bold move when proposed and temporary regulations
were issued September 24, 2009, under I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) and §
6229(c)(2).1 6 1 Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(1)(iii) offered a surprise
for tax practitioners throughout all jurisdictions, as it attempted to
circumvent the judicial reasoning through which the IRS lost the
This regulation clearly defines "gross
extended limitations cases.
income," for purposes of an omission of gross income under I.R.C. §
6501(e)(1)(A), exactly the same as the definition under § 61(a).4 62
Specifically it states, "'Gross income,' with respect to disposals of
property other than goods or services sold in a trade or business, shall be
defined to include the gain from the amount realized as reduced by the
'unrecovered cost or other basis of the property. "'463 Furthermore, the
regulation specifically provides that "except for disposals of property
other than goods or services sold in a trade or business, any basis
overstatement which creates an understated amount of gross income will
be deemed an 'omission of gross income' for purposes of. . . §

6501(e)(1)(A)."4 64
One cannot fault the IRS for its frustrating attempts to close the "tax
gap" by litigating cases clearly appearing to lack any business purpose or
The substantive
economic substance short of eliminating taxes.
arguments against these various forms of Son-of-BOSS cases were
silenced with an end-play using the fifty-year-old Supreme Court Colony
interpretation based on the legislative intent interpretations of a
predecessor statute. One cannot help but consider the pitfalls of
interpreting the earlier statute and the real logic to several of the IRS's
Nonetheless, the "rule of law" guarding
asserted arguments.
constitutional judicial precedent is a strong sword. Given the real
differences between the 1958 interpretations when "inflated basis" arose
solely from the improper deduction of research and development
expenses, in comparison to the Son-of-BOSS transactions lacking in
economic substance, one can ponder if a different conclusion would
occur if Colony were decided today. Nonetheless, in light of Treas. Reg.

461. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(1)(iii) (2009).

462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
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§ 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(1)(iii), it appears that the IRS has promulgated a
definition of gross income that comports with its arguments in the cases
it lost in front of the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit and the Federal
Circuit. One might have expected the IRS to enlist congressional
assistance for statutory modification to override this case law. However,
in light of the revenues lost from its defeats, one can only assume that
the IRS was likely wary of wasting any further time losing "tax-gap"
dollar recovery. Nonetheless, challenges to this regulation have already
begun.
The first litigation challenging these newly issued treasury
regulations appeared during the editing of this Article with the Tax
Court decision issued on May 6, 2010, in a motion to reconsider
Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner.465 In its
original decision in Intermountain I, siding with the taxpayer, the Tax
Court held that the IRS was barred from asserting the application of the
extended six-year statute of limitation under I.R.C. § 6501.466 The
assessment in this case was also due to an allegedly overstated basis by
Intermountain Insurance Service. 67 In determining the invalidity of the
asserted six-year extended statute, again the Tax Court followed
Bakersfield 1468 as precedent, supported by the rationale of the Supreme
Court's holding in Colony. That is, as discussed infra, Colony interpreted
the omission of gross income required under § 6501 to be an omission of
"specific income receipts," not merely an overstatement of basis.469

465. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm'r (IntermountainII), No. 5868-06,
2010 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14 (May 6, 2010).
466. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm'r (Intermountain 1), No. 2586806, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 144 (2009).
467. Id. at *2-3. In Intennountain I, several transactions occurred through which a
greater tax basis was asserted for business assets sold in 1999 for $1.9 million. Id. at *2.
The 1999 partnership income tax return reported the gross sales price, reduced by the
stepped up basis of approximately $2 million, after deducting $131,544 of depreciation.
Id. In 2006, the IRS issued an FPAA asserting that capital contributions to the
partnership of $2.197 million were overstated, thereby overstating partnership basis by
approximately $2 million. Id. at *2-3. Through the transactions, the overstated
partnership basis was used to step up the partnership's business assets, resulting in an
alleged $2 million overstatement of the tax basis as reported on form 4797 (sales of
business property) in the 1999 partnership tax return. Id. at *2.
468. Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm'r (Bakersfield I), No. 4204-06, 128 T.C.
207 (2007).
469. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33, 36 (1958) (emphasizing the legislative
history of section 275(c), the predecessor of I.R.C. § 6501, in deciding that a basis
overstatement was not within the classification of an omission of gross income).
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Based on the issuance of these temporary regulations in
IntermountainII,470 the IRS filed a motion to reconsider and vacate to the
Tax Court. Based on Alioto v. Commissioner,' the IRS argued that the
Tax Court had the authority to vacate its decision in Intermountain I to
consider the application of these regulations." Alioto recognized that
revisions in the law could be grounds for granting a motion to
reconsider and a motion to vacate.47 ' However, the Tax Court did not
simply deny the motion by distinguishing Alioto.4 14 Instead, the Tax
Court appeared ready to do battle against these temporary regulations as
it proceeded to address the viability of these regulations.
The court first addressed the applicability of the temporary
regulations based on their effective date. 7' The clear language of these
temporary regulations makes them applicable to all tax years for which
the statute of limitations for assessing tax has not expired before
September 24, 2009.4" These regulations offer no further guidance or
instructive definitions as to how to calculate the "statute of limitations
for assessing tax."4 " On November 23, 2009, the IRS chief counsel did
indicate, in Notice CC-2010-010, that the temporary regulations applied
to "any docketed Tax court case in which the period of limitations ... as
interpreted in the temporary regulations did not expire with respect to
the tax year at issue, before September 24, 2009, and in which no final
decision has been entered."47 ' The IRS's position in Intermountain II was
that under § 6501(e)(1)(A), as interpreted in the newly issued
regulations, the six-year statute would apply to Intermountain's 1999 tax

470. IntermountainII, 2010 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14, at *9-10.
471. Alioto v. Comm'r, No. 14356-03, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 63 (2008).
472. Intermountain II, 2010 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14, at *12-13.
473. Alioto, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 63, at *22-23.
474. Id. As discussed in the concurring opinion, Alioto is easily distinguished from the
facts of Intermountain 1, as Alioto involved the vacating of a Tax Court decision in which
jurisdiction was found not to exist, but the grounds for such jurisdiction was
subsequently provided by a statutory expansion in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006. Id. The Tax Court could easily have substantiated a position that law revisions
from statutory revisions by Congress are distinguished as stronger grounds to vacate a
prior judgment, when compared to the situation in Intermountain I in which the IRS
speedily issued regulations thirty days after the Intermountain I verdict, particularly in
light of arguments as to the legality of the process through which these regulations were
issued. IntermountainII, 2010 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14, at *37-39.
475. Intermountain II, 2010 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14, at *15-16.
476. Id. at *16-17.
477. Id. at *17-18.
478. Id. at *17 n.9.
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return for two reasons.4 79 First, under the newly issued regulations, the
basis overstatement which created an understated amount of gross
income in Intermountain II would be deemed an "omission of gross
income" for purposes of § 6501(e)(1)(A), since it did not arise from the
Second, as the IRS
trade or business of selling goods and services."
apply
in
Intermountain
II. Since
logic follows, the six-year statute would
the FPAA assessing the additional tax attributable to the understated
gain as derived from the overstated basis had been issued to
Intermountain on September 14, 2006, before the expiration of the sixyear statute, the statute of limitations for assessing tax had not expired
before September 24, 2009.48'
While reading this decision, one can almost imagine mocking
laughter from the Tax Court as it concludes that the IRS's interpretation
of its own regulation is "erroneous and inconsistent with the regulations"
as well as an interpretation that is "irreparably marred by circular, resultdriven logic and the wishful notion that the temporary regulations
should apply to this case because Intermountain was involved in
what ... [is believed to be] an abusive ... transaction."8
Judges
Halpern and Holmes (who concurred in the result of the majority's
decision only) considered the authority of § 7805(b), by which the
secretary can determine the extent to which regulations can be applied
without retroactive effect. Considering the specific statements in IRS
Chief Counsel Notice CC-2010-010,"' the concurring judges felt that
the majority's conclusion was misplaced by solely applying the threeyear statute to determine applicability under the "effective date
analysis." 8 4 Instead, the concurring judges sought a more thoroughly
reasoned legal analysis by the majority opinion of the secretary's
479. Id. at *16-17.
480. Id. at *17.
481. Intermountain II, 2010 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14, at *18.
482. Id. at *19.
483. IRS Chief Counsel Notice CC-2010-001, 2009 CCN LEXIS 23 (Nov. 23, 2009),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdm/cc-2010-001.pdf.
Notice CC-2010-001
provides:
The temporary regulations apply to taxable years with respect to which the
applicable period of limitations for assessing tax did not expire before
September 24, 2009. Accordingly, the temporary regulations apply to any
docketed Tax Court case in which the period of limitations under sections
6229(c)(2) and 6501(e)(1)(A), as interpreted in the temporary regulations, did
not expire with respect to the tax year at issue, before September 24, 2009, and
in which no final decision has been entered.
Id.
484. Intermountain II, 2010 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 14, at *41-42.
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authority to retroactively override the Supreme Court's interpretation of
a statute."8 Absent that, these judges preferred an abandonment of the
effective date applicability issue in favor of a decision grounded in
different issues.4 86
The second issue that the majority briefly reviewed was the
standard to apply when determining whether judicial deference should
be given to the temporary regulations, if applicable. 87 Its review does
not delve deeply into the judicial debate over how much deference
should be afforded an agency's rules for enforcement of the code.
Rather, it concluded that the Supreme Court's review of legislative
history in Colony had clarified what was first considered ambiguous
The
language, thereby foreclosing the agency's interpretation.4 8
concurring judges offer us a preview of the likely issues to be raised as
other courts consider this same issue, yet they do not seem as assured of
the conclusion and rationale behind the majority decision. 8
Nonetheless, where the majority stops with these two issues in its
holding to support denying both motions, the concurring judges would
reach the same result as the majority, yet they would base their
conclusion on what they identify as "firmer ground."490 That is, the
regulations are in violation of the rulemaking procedures required by the
Administrative Procedure Act.49 ' The concurring decision offers an
excellent review of this argument, which we will likely see repeated as
the validity of these regulations continues to be challenged. However,
the scope of this discussion is beyond the goals of this Article.
Nonetheless, one thing is clear, the validity of Treas. Reg. §
301.6501(e)-1T(a)(1)(iii) is yet to be determined as IntermountainII was
appealed by the IRS, through notice of appeal filed with the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on July 27, 2010. Look for
further discussions and developments on these issues in the future
because the IRS is not likely to give up easily, given the extent of tax
revenues at risk under the interpretations of the applicability of the sixyear extended statute.

485. Id. at *44-45.
486. Id. at *45.
487. Id. at *21.
488. Id. at *21-34.
489. Id. at *46-60.
490. Id. at *60.
491. 5 U.S.C.A. H 551-59, 701-06 (West 2007 & supp. 2009), amended by The
Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 6402, 124 Stat. 753, 75363 (2010).
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III. CONCLUSION
This concludes coverage of the income tax developments from 2009
through the spring of 2010 which impacted Subchapter K and
Subchapter S taxation of partnerships and corporations, as well as the
application of the extended statute of limitations. It is this Author's
intent that such primary authority aid practitioners by providing
guidance for the avoidance of I.R.C. § 6662 accuracy related penalties,
and instructions for navigating the possible traps of § 6694(a) preparer
penalties and Circular 230 sanctions. Coverage of statutory tax law
enactments as well as Tax Court and Fourth Circuit judicial
pronouncements interpreting tax law facilitates this goal. Nonetheless,
attention to developments from outside of the Fourth Circuit's
geographic jurisdiction, will enhance formulation of tax positions on
which the Fourth Circuit has not yet taken a position. This is
particularly true where the Tax Court or appropriate district court has
not definitively addressed an issue. With this caveat in mind, consider
these developments as a valuable "tool in the toolbox" for maneuvering
the "land mines" of today's complex tax practice.
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APPENDIX A
HIRING INCENTIVES TO RESTORE EMPLOYMENT ACT TO
MODIFICATION OF IRC § 6501(E)

IRC § 6501(e) (2009)
IRC § 6501(e) Substantial Omission of Items.-Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (c)6501(e)(1) Income taxes.-In the case of any tax imposed by subtitle
A6501(e)(1)(A) General rule.-If the taxpayer omits from gross income
an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent
of the amount of gross income stated in the return, the tax may be
assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be
begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after the return
was filed. For purposes of this subparagraph6501(e)(1)(A)(i) In the case of a trade or business, the term "gross
income" means the total of the amounts received or accrued from
the sale of goods or services (if such amounts are required to be
shown on the return) prior to diminution by the cost of such sales
or services; and
6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) In determining the amount omitted from gross
income, there shall not be taken into account any amount which is
omitted from gross income stated in the return if such amount is
disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to the return, in a
manner adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature and amount
of such item.
IRC § 6501(e) (March 18, 2010)
IRC § 6501(e) Substantial Omission Of Items. -Except
provided in subsection (c)

as otherwise

6501(e)(1) Income taxes.-In the case of any tax imposed by subtitle
A-
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6501(e)(1)(A) General rule.-If the taxpayer omits from gross
income an amount properly includible therein and6501(e)(1)(A)(i) such amount is in excess of 25 percent of
the amount of gross income stated in the return, or
6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) such amount6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)(I) is attributable to one or more assets
with respect to which information is required to be
reported under section 6038D (or would be so required if
such section were applied without regard to the dollar
threshold specified in subsection (a) thereof and without
regard to any exceptions provided pursuant to subsection
(h)(1) thereof), and
6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)(II) is in excess of $5,000,
the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection
of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within
6 years after the return was filed.
6501(e)(1)(B) Determining gross income. -For purposes of
subparagraph (A)6501(e)(1)(B)(i) In the case of a trade or business, the
term "gross income" means the total of the amounts
received or accrued from the sale of goods or services (if
such amounts are required to be shown on the return)
prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services;
and
6501(e)(1)(B)(ii) In determining the amount omitted
from gross income, there shall not be taken into account
any amount which is omitted from gross income stated in
the return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in
a statement attached to the return, in a manner adequate
to apprise the Secretary of the nature and amount of such
item.
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